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Judicial Review of Refugee
Determinations: The Luck of the
Draw?
Sean Rehaag*
Judicial review is often the only way to correct errors made by the Immigration and Refugee
Board in refugee determinations. Applicants must seek leave from the Federal Court, where
a judge will decide if their case is suitable for judicial review. The stakes are high for refugee
claimants confronting deportation to countries where they may face persecution, torture or
death.
The author reviews over 23 000 applications for judicial review from 2005 to 2010, and
finds troubling inconsistency in leave grant rates at the Federal Court. Over 36 per cent of
judges deviated by more than 50 per cent from the average rate of granting leave, with twenty
judges granting leave more than ten times as often as the judge with the lowest leave grant rate.
This inconsistency continues at the judicial review stage. The author considers several external
factors that could explain it, from the judge’s political party of appointment to the impact of
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision on standard of review in Dunsmuir. Ultimately, the
author concludes that the outcome of a leave application hinges largely on which judge is assigned
to decide the application, and that this poses an arbitrary barrier to access to justice for refugees.
The author considers various solutions to this problem, from abolishing the leave
requirement to requiring written reasons or a panel of judges. At a minimum, he suggests
that the test for leave should be clarified, as the limited jurisprudence has provided insufficient
guidance to judges. Forthcoming reforms to the refugee determination system, including
the introduction of the Refugee Appeal Division, will in his view increase rather than
diminish the importance of fair and consistent judicial review of refugee determinations.
*  Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. I am grateful for the painstaking research
assistance provided by Umair Abdul, Simran Bakshi, Dette Bourchier, Monica Cop, Justin
Dharamdial, Adrienne Lipsey, Anastasia Mandziuk, Ian McKellar, Alex Minkin, Jessica
Lynne Morris, Nedko Petkov, Sharmin Rahman and Rathika Vasavithasan. I would like
to thank Richard Haigh, Director of the Osgoode Public Interest Requirement at Osgoode
Hall Law School, for helping to secure research assistants for this project. I would also like
to acknowledge the generous financial assistance provided by York University through
the SSHRC Small Grants Program. Finally, I have greatly benefited from feedback on
prior versions of the study from several Federal Court judges who attended a presentation
on 20 January 2012, and from attendees at the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers
National Conference on 9 March 2012. Comments and suggestions from the anonymous
peer reviewers were also much appreciated. Unless otherwise indicated, all references in
this article are current to 27 June 2012.
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Introduction
Refugee determinations are among the most important decisions
Canadian administrative tribunals and courts are called upon to make.
If errors in first-instance refugee determinations at the Immigration and
Refugee Board (IRB) are not caught and corrected through judicial review,
refugees may be deported to countries where they face persecution,
torture or death. Refugee claimants who apply for judicial review should,
therefore, be able to expect that the outcomes of their applications will
hinge on the merits of the cases they put forward.
Drawing on a database of over 23 000 applications for judicial review
involving refugee matters from 2005 to 2010 in the Federal Court, this
study examines whether outcomes in these high-stakes applications turn
on their merits or on which judge is assigned to decide the application.
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Unfortunately, as this article reveals, outcomes at the Federal Court over
the past five years all too often come down to the luck of the draw.
The article begins with an overview of Canada’s existing refugee
determination system, and the role of the Federal Court within that
system. Then, after discussing the literature on Federal Court decision
making in the refugee law context, it sets out the methodology and the
findings of this study. Finally, the article concludes by offering a number
of policy recommendations based on the findings of the study and in light
of the major reforms to Canada’s refugee determination system that are
expected in the near future.

I. Canada’s Refugee Determination System and
the Federal Court
For readers unfamiliar with Canada’s existing refugee determination
process, this section places Federal Court refugee law decision making in
context. It provides an overview of first-instance refugee determinations
at the IRB, sets out the processes followed and tests applied in the
Federal Court at both the application for leave and the judicial review
stages, discusses appeals to the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme
Court of Canada, and outlines subsequent immigration procedures that
unsuccessful refugee claimants may access before removal from Canada.
A. Refugee Decisions at the Immigration and Refugee Board
Canada’s inland refugee determination system1—which is expected to
undergo significant revisions shortly2—gives the IRB’s Refugee Protection
Division (RPD) responsibility for first-instance decisions.3 Refugee
claimants whose cases are eligible for referral to the RPD4 are entitled
1.  For an overview of the inland refugee determination process, see Martin Jones & Sasha
Baglay, Refugee Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 215–53.
2.  See Part IV.D, below, for more on this topic.
3.  Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, ss 99–101, 170 [IRPA].
4.  Ibid, s 100. There are limited grounds for ineligibility, including having made a prior
refugee claim in Canada, having travelled to Canada via a designated safe third country and
having been found inadmissible due to security concerns, violations of human rights or
certain types of criminality (ibid, s 101).
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to hearings5 before RPD Members, who are quasi-judicial administrative
decision-makers appointed for fixed terms.6 The purpose of the hearing
is to determine whether claimants meet the definitions of “convention
refugees”7 or “persons in need of protection”,8 and to determine whether
claimants who are covered by these definitions are nonetheless excluded
from refugee protection on grounds related to criminality or violation of
human rights.9
If the RPD Member denies the refugee claim, written reasons must be
given after the hearing. Alternatively, if the RPD Member grants refugee
protection, written reasons need only be given at the request of the
claimant or the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (the Minister).10
In the case of a negative decision, the RPD Member may also declare the
claim to have no credible basis if there was no credible or trustworthy
evidence that could have justified granting refugee protection.11 Such a
declaration means that the claimant is not entitled to an automatic stay of
a removal order pending the determination of any application for judicial
review.
Since 2002, Canada’s immigration legislation has contained provisions
allowing a claimant or the Minister to appeal an RPD decision on its
merits to the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) of the IRB,12 but those
provisions have not yet come into force.13 The failure to implement the

5.  Ibid, s 170(b). The RPD may grant, but not deny, refugee protection without holding
a hearing (ibid, s 170(f)). As a matter of constitutional law, refugee claimants in Canada
are entitled to a hearing whenever credibility is at stake. See Singh v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1985] 1 SCR 177, 17 DLR (4th) 422.
6.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 153. Only a small proportion of RPD Members have legal
training (10% of the RPD’s complement are required to be lawyers with at least 5 years of
experience) (ibid, s 153(4)).
7.  Ibid, s 96.
8.  Ibid, s 97.
9.  Ibid, s 98.
10.  Ibid, s 169. Written reasons must also be provided when refugee protection is granted
in cases where exclusion due to criminality or violating human rights is at issue. Refugee
Protection Division Rules, SOR/2002-228, r 61 [RPD Rules].
11.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 107.
12.  Ibid, ss 110–11.
13. See ibid, s 275; Order Fixing June 28, 2002 as the Date of the Coming into Force of Certain
Provisions of the Act, SI/2002-97.
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RAD has been sharply criticized by refugee advocates,14 and is especially
problematic in light of studies indicating that refugee determinations at
the RPD appear to turn at least in part on extra-legal considerations.15
Of particular importance are studies showing massive and unexplained
variations in refugee claim grant rates from one RPD Member to another,
even when factors such as the claimant’s country of origin are taken into
account.16 Because the RAD is not available, there is no recourse within the
IRB when a claimant believes the RPD erred in a refugee determination,
whether because of extra-legal factors such as the assignment of the case
to an RPD Member who seldom or never grants refugee protection,17

14. See e.g. Amnesty International Canada, “Canada’s Refugee Appeal Division:
Amnesty’s Issues and Concerns” (16 November 2007), online: Amnesty International
<http://www.amnesty.ca>; Canadian Council for Refugees, “Refugee Appeal Division
Backgrounder” (December 2006), online: Canadian Council for Refugees <http://ccrweb.
ca> [CCR, “RAD”].
15. Extra-legal factors may include whether the claimant had experienced legal counsel,
the adjudicator’s gender and the political party that appointed the adjudicator. See e.g.
Sean Rehaag, “The Role of Counsel in Canada’s Refugee Determination System: An
Empirical Assessment” (2011) 49:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 71 [Rehaag, “Counsel”]; Sean Rehaag,
“Do Women Refugee Judges Really Make a Difference? An Empirical Analysis of Gender
and Outcomes in Canadian Refugee Determinations” (2011) 23:2 CJWL 627 [Rehaag,
“Gender”].
16. See Sean Rehaag, “Troubling Patterns in Canadian Refugee Adjudication” (2008) 39:2
Ottawa L Rev 335 [Rehaag, “Troubling”]. For more recent data on variations in grant rates
at the RPD, see Sean Rehaag, “UPDATED 2011 Refugee Claim Data and IRB Member
Recognition Rates” (6 August 2012), online: Canadian Council for Refugees <http://
ccrweb.ca> [Rehaag, “Data”]. For media investigations of variations in refugee claim grant
rates, see Marina Jiménez, “Refugee approval rates vary widely”, The Globe and Mail (24
July 2004) A1, online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>; David
McKie, “Fluctuations in refugee rulings trouble critics”, CBC News (17 December 2009),
online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca>.
17. One RPD Member, David McBean, denied refugee status in every case he heard from
the time he was appointed to the IRB in 2008 until 2010. See Nicholas Keung, “Getting
asylum the luck of the draw?”, Toronto Star (4 March 2011) A1, online: Toronto Star
<http://www.thestar.com> [Keung, "Luck"].
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or because of more run-of-the-mill errors that are inevitable in any
administrative decision-making process.18
B. Leave Decisions at the Federal Court
Until the RAD is implemented, the only procedure available when a
claimant (or the Minister) is unhappy with a first-instance RPD refugee
determination is to apply for judicial review in the Federal Court.19
Either party may begin the process of judicial review of an RPD decision
by filing an application for leave with the Federal Court.20 With a few
exceptions—such as where the RPD declares a claim to have no credible
basis—unsuccessful refugee claimants who apply for judicial review
generally benefit from an automatic stay on removal, pending the
determination of their application.21
The timelines for applications for leave are tight: the application
must be filed within 15 days after the RPD sends written reasons.22 The
respondent has ten days to indicate opposition to the application by filing
a notice to appear.23 The application must be perfected within 30 days by
filing an application record, which includes the decision under review, a
18. While errors are inevitable in all administrative decision-making processes, several
factors in the refugee determination process make them more likely. For example, refugee
adjudicators must determine what is likely to happen in the future (that in the event that
a refugee claimant is deported) in a foreign country—frequently a country that is unstable
and about which little reliable information is available. Moreover, the key evidence is
typically found in the testimony of the claimant, who may suffer from mental health
challenges related to surviving traumatic experiences and who often experiences stress as a
result of the high stakes and unfamiliarity of the hearing process. In addition, testimony is
generally mediated by an interpreter, and interpretation errors may occur. For a discussion
of these and other challenges in refugee determination, see CCR, “RAD”, supra note 14.
19. For an overview of the judicial review process, see Jones & Baglay, supra note 1 at 273–
87. See also Federal Court, “Judicial Review (Immigration) Practice Guide” (May 2006),
online: Federal Court <http://www.fct-cf.gc.ca>.
20.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 72.
21.  Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s 231 [IRPA Regulations].
22.  IRPA, supra note 3, ss 72, 169(f); Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection
Rules, SOR/93-22, s 5 [FC Immigration Rules]. Where there are “special reasons”, the
Federal Court may extend the deadline, even after it has expired. IRPA, supra note 3, s
72(2)(c).
23.  FC Immigration Rules, supra note 22, s 8.
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memorandum of argument and supporting affidavits.24 If the respondent
wants to oppose the application for leave, the respondent then has 30 days
to file a memorandum of argument and supporting affidavits,25 and the
applicant may file a reply within ten days.26
A single Federal Court judge (the leave judge) decides whether to
grant leave in any given case. Applications are not screened before being
assigned to a particular leave judge, so cases are effectively assigned at
random. In other words, leave judges—unlike RPD Members who make
first-instance refugee determinations—do not specialize in particular
types of applications, or applications involving claimants from particular
countries.27
Hearings on leave determinations are only held in exceptional
circumstances,28 so a leave judge usually decides whether to grant leave
solely on the basis of a review of the court file. Reasons for granting or
denying leave are not typically provided. When leave is denied, there is
no further appeal.29
The test for when leave should be granted has not been established
by legislation or the rules of the court. As Harrington J noted in Hinton
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), “[t]he parameters
which should influence a judge’s discretion are not set out. There is very
24.  Ibid, s 10.
25.  Ibid, s 11.
26.  Ibid, s 12.
27. Jon B Gould, Colleen Sheppard & Johannes Wheeldon, “A Refugee from Justice?
Disparate Treatment in the Federal Court of Canada” (2010) 32:4 Law & Pol’y 454 at 459;
Ian Greene & Paul Shaffer, “Leave to Appeal and Leave to Commence Judicial Review in
Canada’s Refugee-Determination System: Is the Process Fair?” (1992) 4:1 Int’l J Refugee L
71 at 79–81.
28.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 72(2)(d).
29.  Ibid, s 72(2)(e). It should be noted that applicants may bring a motion for
reconsideration where the denial of leave is inconsistent with reasons provided (if reasons
were provided), or where a matter that should have been dealt with in denying leave was
overlooked or accidentally omitted. See Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, s 397. Courts
have, however, generally interpreted the scope for reconsideration quite narrowly—and it
is, understandably, difficult to establish that the court overlooked or accidentally omitted
considering a matter in denying leave when reasons are not typically provided. See e.g.
Boateng v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 112 NR 318, 11 Imm
LR (2d) 9 (FCA); Dan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 189 FTR
301, 6 Imm LR (3d) 84 (see especially at para 17); Key v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2011 FC 92, [2011] FCJ no 403 (QL).
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little guiding jurisprudence, which is not surprising given that reasons are
usually not provided and that the decision cannot be appealed”.30
Although there is not much jurisprudence in this area, a handful of
decisions do discuss the leave requirement, usually in cases where the
test for leave is ancillary to other legal issues. The leading case is Bains
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),31 where Mahoney J
said, in rejecting a constitutional challenge to the leave requirement:
The only question to be considered in disposing of an application for leave . . . is whether
or not a fairly arguable case is disclosed for the relief proposed to be sought if leave were
to be granted. . . . [T]he requirement for leave is in reality the other side of the coin of the
traditional jurisdiction to summarily terminate proceedings that disclose no reasonably
arguable case.32

Similarly, in Saleh v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),33
Teitelbaum J offered this analysis of the test for leave: “I am satisfied that
on an application for leave one should grant such a request unless it is
plain and obvious that the applicant would have no reasonable chance of
succeeding”.34
More recently, in Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada,35 Hughes J
characterized the test for leave in these terms: “the standard for granting
an Order permitting judicial review is low. The matter at that point is
to be dealt with in a summary way. The standard on a leave application
is whether or not a fairly arguable case is disclosed”.36 In Level v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),37 Russell J noted that “[w]hile
the leave judge determines if there is a serious question to be tried, it is
the judge on judicial review who has the opportunity to fully consider
and weigh the merits of the application. . . . [O]n leave to commence an
application, the merits of the parties’ arguments are not to be considered”.38
30. 2008 FC 1007 at para 15, [2008] 333 FTR 288.
31. (1990), 47 Admin LR 317, 109 NR 239 (FCA).
32.  Ibid at paras 1, 3.
33. [1989] FCJ No 825 (QL) (TD).
34.  Ibid.
35.  2006 FC 1046, 299 FTR 114.
36.  Ibid at para 20. See also Sunarti v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2011 FC 191 at para 14, 384 FTR 151.
37.  2010 FC 251, [2011] 3 FCR 60.
38.  Ibid at para 58.
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And finally, in Mina v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),39 a rare case in which reasons were given for denying leave,
Shore J said: “In an application for leave and for judicial review, a serious,
arguable case with serious issues must be submitted”.40
The test for leave has therefore been variably described in the following
terms: a reasonably arguable case; a fairly arguable case; a serious question
to be tried; and whether it is plain and obvious that the applicant has no
reasonable prospect of success. However formulated, the test is highly
permissive: leave should be granted unless it is clear that the judicial
review application has no reasonable chance of success, namely, where
it is so obvious that the application must fail that a determination on the
merits is unnecessary.
C. Judicial Review Decisions at the Federal Court
In cases where leave is granted, a hearing will be scheduled between 30
and 90 days later.41 The leave judge will also set timelines for filing further
documents, including the tribunal record from the IRB, and further
memoranda of argument from the parties.42
A Federal Court judge (JR judge), other than the leave judge, presides
over the hearing. The JR judge must determine whether the applicant
has established that the RPD committed a reviewable and material error.
The Federal Court can overturn an RPD decision where the RPD (1)
acted outside or beyond its jurisdiction; (2) breached principles of natural
justice or procedural fairness; (3) erred in law; (4) made findings of fact
that were perverse or capricious, or were made without due regard to the
available evidence; (5) acted as a result of fraud or perjury; or (6) acted
contrary to law.43
Judicial review is an administrative law process and is subject to
Canadian administrative law norms, including norms on the level of
deference courts must show administrative tribunals. The Federal Court
is generally deferential toward findings of fact and of mixed fact and law
39. 2010 FC 1182, [2010] FCJ no 1482 (QL).
40.  Ibid at para 6.
41.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 74(b).
42.  FC Immigration Rules, supra note 22, r 15(1).
43.  Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, s 18.1(4).
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made by RPD Members. In reviewing such findings it applies a standard
of “reasonableness”,44 on which the question is not whether the JR judge
would have made different findings but whether the findings that were
made were reasonably open to the RPD Member and were adequately
justified. As the Supreme Court put it in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick,45
[a] court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make
a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to
outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of
justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it
is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.46

In immigration and refugee matters, the Federal Court applies the more
exacting standard of “correctness” in some issues of law, including issues
of jurisdiction and procedural fairness.47 When using this standard of
review, the JR judge essentially reconsiders the issue de novo and shows
no deference to the RPD.48
Where the JR judge is of the view that (on the appropriate standard
of review) the RPD Member committed a reviewable and material error,
the judge typically sets aside the RPD decision and orders that the matter
be referred back for redetermination by a different RPD Member. The
JR judge can, however, provide more specific directions to the RPD,
including a direction that the claimant be accorded refugee protection.49
The JR judge usually gives written reasons for the judgment, although
orders can be issued without reasons.
D. Appeals to the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada
In cases where leave has been granted, the decision of the JR judge on
the merits may be subject to appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, but on
tightly limited grounds. A party may appeal only if the JR judge issuing
44.  Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 46, [2009] 1
SCR 339.
45. 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190.
46.  Ibid at para 47.
47.  Khosa, supra note 44 at paras 41–48.
48.  Dunsmuir, supra note 45 at para 50.
49.  Federal Courts Act, supra note 43, s 18.1(3).
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the Federal Court decision certifies that the decision raises a “serious
question of general importance . . . and states the question”.50 Where a JR
judge certifies a question and a party decides to proceed with an appeal,
the Federal Court of Appeal is not limited to answering only the stated
question but can reconsider all relevant issues.51
In a case where the leave judge denies leave, or where leave is granted
but the JR judge does not certify questions for appeal, the decision is final
and cannot be appealed.52 Where a question is certified for appeal by the
JR judge and the case proceeds to the Federal Court of Appeal, a further
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada is possible, but only with leave
from the Supreme Court. Such leave is given only in rare cases that raise
issues of public importance.53
E. Subsequent Immigration Procedures
Aside from appeals, unsuccessful refugee claimants may access
subsequent immigration procedures, including Humanitarian and
Compassionate applications (H&C applications) and Pre-Removal Risk
Assessments (PRRAs).
An H&C application is a request that the Minister exercise discretion
to make an exception from Canada’s regular immigration requirements
on humanitarian grounds—on the grounds that the applicant would
face “unusual, undeserved or disproportionate hardship” if required to
leave Canada.54 Usually the requested exception is that the applicant
be given permanent residence in Canada, even though she does not
qualify for any existing immigration program. While many unsuccessful
refugee claimants make H&C applications, it should be noted that these
applications do not provide refugees who allege that the RPD erroneously
50.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 74(d).
51.  Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 12,
174 DLR (4th) 193.
52.  IRPA, supra note 3, ss 72(2)(e), 74(d).
53.  Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 40.
54.  Singh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 11 at para 18,
340 FTR 29. See also IRPA, supra note 3, s 25.1; Citizenship and Immigration Canada,
Operational Manuals, IP5: Immigrant Applications in Canada made on Humanitarian or
Compassionate Grounds (2011), online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <http://
www.cic.gc.ca>.
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denied their claims with the opportunity to have their cases reassessed
before they are removed from Canada. H&C applicants can be removed
from the country pending determination of their applications. Moreover,
since 2010, the Minister (when assessing an H&C application) has been
prohibited from taking into account any risks to the claimant that could
have been considered in the refugee determination process.55
PRRAs represent a final opportunity, before removal from Canada,
for applicants to demonstrate that they face risks of persecution, risks
to life, risks of torture or risks of cruel and unusual treatment.56 Once
again, however, this procedure does not provide an opportunity to
correct errors made by the RPD. Applicants who made refugee claims
may only present evidence which arose after the refugee hearing or which
the claimant could not reasonably have presented at the hearing.57 As a
result, for unsuccessful refugee claimants, PRRAs are generally of no use
unless something happens between the hearing and the PRRA decision58
to enable a claimant to meet the criteria for refugee status—for example, if
conditions in the claimant’s country have deteriorated.
Although immigration procedures are available, they do not provide
individuals whose claims were erroneously denied by the RPD with a
meaningful opportunity to show that they should not be deported from
Canada to face persecution, torture or even death. As a result, the right
of unsuccessful refugee claimants to access Federal Court judicial review
of negative RPD determinations represents the sole opportunity for the
Canadian legal system to catch mistakes in the refugee determination
process.59
55.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 25(1.3).
56.  Ibid, ss 112–14. See also Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Operational Manuals,
PP3: Pre-removal Risk Assessment (2009), online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada
<http://www.cic.gc.ca>.
57.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 113(a).
58. See e.g. Doumbouya v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1187,
[2007] FCJ no 1553 (QL) (“[t]he PRRA process is intended to assess new risk developments
between the IRB hearing and the scheduled removal date” at para 37).
59. Unsuccessful refugee claimants may turn to international human rights bodies once all
domestic remedies are exhausted. However, the decisions of these bodies are not, in most
cases, binding either as a matter of international or domestic law. Moreover, non-citizens
are frequently deported while decisions of international human rights bodies are pending.
See e.g. Ahani v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), 58 OR (3d) 107,
208 DLR (4th) 66 (CA); Sogi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC
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Against this background, let us now turn to an assessment of how
well the judicial review process for unsuccessful refugee claimants actually
works.

II. Existing Empirical Studies
Several studies have offered empirical assessments of judicial review
of refugee determinations in Canada. These studies are part of a growing
body of empirical legal scholarship examining judicial decision making
in Canada and elsewhere.60 This wider scholarship demonstrates that
outcomes in judicial processes may often turn on factors other than the
merits of a case. Among the myriad of extra-legal factors that have been
found to drive outcomes are the judge assigned to hear the case and the
various aspects of that judge’s identity such as gender, political party of
appointment and political orientation.61
Of course, some variability in the approaches of different judges is
to be expected, as they bring a variety of life experiences to the bench.62
Indeed, some of the strongest arguments for increasing the demographic
diversity of the judiciary invoke benefits to the courts—and the likelihood
that they would at times come to different substantive conclusions—if
currently unrepresented life experiences and perspectives were brought
799, 158 ACWS (3d) 637; Dadar v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006
FC 382, 147 ACWS (3d) 277; Mugesera c Kenney, 2012 QCCS 116, 37 Admin LR (5th) 137.
60. For a review of empirical legal scholarship, see Michael Heise, “An Empirical Analysis
of Empirical Legal Scholarship Production, 1990–2009” [2011:5] U Ill L Rev 1739. See
also Peter Cane & Herbert M Kritzer, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
61. See e.g. James Stribopoulos & Moin A Yahya, “Does a Judge’s Party of Appointment
or Gender Matter to Case Outcomes?: An Empirical Study of the Court of Appeal for
Ontario” (2007) 45:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 315; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Policy
Preference Change and Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 47:1
Osgoode Hall LJ 1; CL Ostberg & Matthew E Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making
in the Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007); Donald R Songer, The
Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada: An Empirical Examination (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2008); Cass R Sunstein et al, Are Judges Political?: An Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006).
62. Roderick A Macdonald & FR Scott, “Parametres of Politics in Judicial Appointments”
(Quebec: Commission of Inquiry into the Appointment Process for Judges in Quebec,
2010).
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onto the bench.63 Nonetheless, the rule of law may be undermined if
extra-legal factors come to play a central role in determining judicial
outcomes.64 When one looks at judicial reviews of refugee determinations,
the question therefore is not whether outcomes will vary with the judge
who hears the case—surely they will. Rather, the question is whether the
degree of variability is within acceptable bounds, and if not, what can be
done about it.65
A. Greene
As discussed below, the leave requirement for unsuccessful refugee
claimants who seek judicial review first came into effect in 1989 amid
significant controversy.66 Soon afterwards, Ian Greene undertook
an empirical study of how refugee claimants fared in Federal Court
applications for leave.67 In an article published in 1992 setting out
preliminary results, Greene explained why the study was done:
63. See Justice Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” (1990)
28:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 507; The Honourable Sonia Sotomayor, “A Latina Judge’s Voice”
(2002) 13:1 La Raza LJ 87.
64. Consistency in judicial decision making is often described as a key feature of the rule
of law. Lon Fuller, for example, argued that applying the law as announced, and deciding
cases according to promulgated norms rather than on an ad hoc basis, are constitutive
features of legality. The Morality of Law, revised ed (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1969). Many legal theorists from various traditions agree with Fuller on this point. See e.g.
Ronald Dworkin, “Philosophy, Morality, and Law—Observations Prompted by Professor
Fuller’s Novel Claim” (1964–1965) 113:5 U Pa L Rev 668 at 669; Jürgen Habermas, Between
Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, translated by
William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996) at 144; HLA Hart, The Concept of
Law, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 207; John Finnis, Natural Law and
Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) at 270–71.
65. Several US scholars have offered a meticulous and comprehensive analysis of whether
variability across judges is excessive in the American refugee determination system, and of
measures that could be taken to reduce this variability. See e.g. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew
I Schoenholtz & Philip G Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication and
Proposals for Reform (New York: New York University Press, 2009).
66. See infra notes 129–32 and accompanying text.
67. Greene & Shaffer, supra note 27. See also Ian Greene et al, Final Appeal: DecisionMaking in Canadian Courts of Appeal (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1998) at
19–21 [Greene, “Final Appeal”].
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A uniform and just application of the law is particularly important in cases of refugee
determination because of the severe human consequences which may result if the law
is misapplied. Further, failure to ensure that the law is consistently applied may violate
guarantees of fundamental justice in Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice under Section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.68

To test whether the new leave requirement posed barriers to a “uniform
and just application of the law” in refugee determinations, the study
reviewed court files in all applications for leave filed in 1990, leading
to a dataset of 2 081 applications.69 It found statistically significant
correlations—at unusually high confidence levels—between individual
leave judges and leave outcomes.70 In fact, the variations in leave grant
rates from one judge to another were described as “nothing short of
astounding”.71 For example, while the average leave grant rate for all cases
reviewed was 25%,72 Pratte J granted leave in only 14% of his cases (203
decisions), and Desjardins J granted leave in 48% of hers (188 decisions).73
Greene’s analysis also showed that patterns in the assignment of cases
to particular judges did not appear to account for those variations.74
Nonetheless, to further test whether the caseloads assigned to individual
judges differed in some relevant way, Greene retained an expert in
immigration law to conduct a blind review of 390 randomly selected
case files to independently assess whether, in that expert’s view, leave
should have been granted.75 The purpose of this exercise was not to
discern whether leave really ought to have been granted in each case,
but whether the rates at which the expert would have granted leave
varied for applications decided by different judges. It turned out that the
68. Greene & Shaffer, supra note 27 at 75.
69. Greene, “Final Appeal”, supra note 67 at 19–21. In 1990, 2 341 applications for leave
were filed. However, data could not be collected on 260 cases (ibid at 220, n 47).
70. Greene & Shaffer, supra note 27 at 78.
71. Greene, “Final Appeal”, supra note 67 at 20.
72.  Ibid at 220, n 47.
73.  Ibid at 20–21.
74. Greene & Shaffer, supra note 27 at 79–81. See also Greene, “Final Appeal”, supra note
67 at 19, n 44 and accompanying text.
75. The review was “blind” in the sense that the expert was not informed of the outcome
in the application or the identity of the judge who decided it. See Greene, “Final Appeal”,
supra note 67 at 220, n 45.
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expert’s leave grant rate was consistent across cases assigned to different
leave judges. This further supported the conclusion that variations in
leave grant rates across judges related to how individual judges decided
the applications, rather than to patterns in the cases assigned to them.76
On the basis of the findings, Greene said that “[t]here is no escaping the
conclusion that given the same law and the same kind of factual issues,
some judges took a ‘strict’ approach to granting leave . . . while others
took a more ‘liberal’ approach”.77
Where a judicial review application was heard and determined on the
merits after leave had been granted, Greene went on to compare those
final outcomes in cases where leave was granted by “strict” judges and
by “liberal” judges, in an attempt to see “whether the ‘strict’ judges were
better at screening out weak cases at the leave stage than the ‘liberal’
judges”.78 Interestingly, however, no statistically significant correlation
was found between rates of success on the merits (once leave was granted)
and whether the leave judge had a high or low rate of granting leave.79
This led the authors to conclude that “refugee applicants who were
unfortunate enough to have their leave applications come before a ‘strict’
judge may have had less access to justice in the long run than those who
were lucky enough to have their applications come before a more ‘liberal’
judge”.80
Greene and Shaffer argued that the study conclusively demonstrated
that the leave requirement, as it was applied in 1990, limited access by
refugee claimants to an effective and fair appeal process, in a way that
arguably violated constitutional norms of procedural justice.81 One way
to address this concern, they suggested, was the adoption of a practice
common in many appellate courts of deciding cases by panels of several
judges, “to mitigate the effects of individual judicial predispositions”.82
Another suggestion was for the court to modify the leave process so that
when one judge refused to grant leave, the matter would be automatically
76.  Ibid at 19–20.
77.  Ibid at 20.
78.  Ibid at 21.
79.  Ibid.
80.  Ibid at 21.
81. Greene & Shaffer, supra note 27 at 82.
82.  Ibid.
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reviewed by a second judge who could either confirm the decision or
grant leave.83
B. Gould, Sheppard and Wheeldon
Jon Gould, Colleen Sheppard and Johannes Wheeldon updated
the Greene study with new data from 2003. They examined a sample
of 617 court files in applications filed in 2003 for leave and judicial
review involving immigration decisions.84 Because they were interested
in examining both leave decisions and decisions on the merits where
leave was granted, they oversampled cases where leave was granted to
ensure a sufficiently large pool of cases decided on the merits. This led
to two groups of cases: 275 applications where leave was denied, and 342
applications where leave was granted. Various data points were collected
for each application, including outcomes and demographic details of
applicants, judges and counsel. A panel of five immigration law experts
was also consulted to assess the “ideological reputation” of the judges
whose decisions were under consideration.85
The study found that a variety of factors correlated with patterns in
outcomes both at the leave stage and on the merits. These factors included
the type of application (immigration applicant versus refugee applicant)86
and the gender, age and country of origin of the applicant.87 Applicants
represented by lawyers were much more likely to be granted leave than
83. Greene, “Final Appeal”, supra note 67 at 221, n 49.
84. Supra note 27 at 465.
85.  Ibid at 465–67.
86. Unlike the prior study, this study examined applications for judicial review involving
both immigration law and refugee law. Many aspects of the process for judicial review are
similar in these two contexts. For example, leave is required for both. See IRPA, supra note
3, s 72. However, there are also important differences. For instance, in many immigration
law applications for judicial review, there is no automatic stay on removal pending the
determination of judicial review, whereas most refugee applicants benefit from automatic
stays of removal. See IRPA Regulations, supra note 21, s 231. Similarly, in many immigration
law applications, constitutional due process norms are attenuated, whereas in refugee law
applications, robust constitutional due process norms are almost always engaged. Compare
Chiarelli v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 SCR 711, 90 DLR
(4th) 289, with Singh, supra note 5.
87.  Gould, Sheppard & Wheeldon, supra note 27 at 467–75.
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unrepresented applicants.88 In the authors’ words, “these findings . . . are
troubling. . . . A system designed to provide due process of law ought not
to be tilted in favor of those who can hire an experienced lawyer, and yet
that is exactly what is happening”.89 The personal characteristics of judges
were also found to be important factors. For example, at the leave stage,
“a judge’s ideology had a significant, powerful effect . . . with liberal
judges more likely than conservative judges to grant an applicant leave”.90
The same pattern was observed in decisions on the merits.91 In addition,
the authors found that: “Francophone judges [were] . . . more skeptical
of the merits of immigration appeals, even when controlling for the fact
that they [were] more conservative than their Anglophone colleagues”.92
Gould, Sheppard and Wheeldon concluded that their findings
reaffirmed the Greene study’s central conclusion—namely, that outcomes
hinged at least in part on extra-legal factors, including which judge
was assigned to decide an application.93 This underscored concerns
they suggested about how the Federal Court treated immigration and
asylum cases and raised “questions about the very legitimacy of Canada’s
immigration and refugee system”.94
C. Butler
A more recent investigative report by journalist Don Butler echoes
some of the findings of the Gould, Sheppard and Wheeldon study.95
Butler reviewed “480 immigration, refugee and citizenship decisions
issued by the Federal Court between January and June 2011”.96 Cases were
identified by searching reasons for decisions posted on the Federal Court’s
website for applications involving citizenship or immigration, and then
by excluding decisions dealing only with procedural matters, such as costs
88.  Ibid at 471.
89.  Ibid at 475.
90.  Ibid at 477.
91.  Ibid.
92.  Ibid at 478.
93.  Ibid at 481.
94.  Ibid at 482.
95. Don Butler, “Would-be immigrants face uncertain justice”, Ottawa Citizen (26
November 2011) A1, online: <http://www.ottawacitizen.com>.
96.  Ibid.
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awards.97 Outcomes in the identified cases were then examined in light of
which judge issued the decision, the judge’s gender and political party of
appointment, and whether the judge was from Quebec.98
Butler reported that there were significant differences in rates at
which different judges overturned immigration decisions. For example,
Blanchard J overturned such decisions in 14% of the seven cases identified,
whereas Campbell J overturned them in 100% of the 16 cases identified.
More generally, according to Butler, “outcomes appear to split on party
lines”, with judges appointed by Liberal Party prime ministers more likely
to overturn immigration decisions than judges appointed by Progressive
Conservative or Conservative party prime ministers. Male judges and
judges from Quebec were less likely to grant judicial review than female
judges and judges from the rest of Canada.99
D. Need for a Further Study
Because the Greene study examined all applications for leave in
refugee cases filed in 1990, it provides compelling evidence that different
judges were applying the leave requirement inconsistently. However, it is
important to recall the context. The study examined leave decisions at a
time when the leave requirement was a new and controversial procedure.
It had only recently come into effect, and the criteria for granting leave had
yet to be definitively established through case law. The strong association
the study found between outcomes and judges could arguably be partly
attributed to the novelty of the leave procedure.
The Gould, Sheppard and Wheeldon study does suggest that such
inconsistencies between judges persisted in 2003, long after the Federal
Court had developed substantial experience with the leave requirement.
That study also helpfully examines a variety of other factors that may affect
outcomes—especially claimant demographics and legal representation. At
the same time, however, the study has some methodological limitations,
most notably problems related to sample size and to the representativeness
of the samples, given that cases granted leave were oversampled. Also,
97. E-mail from Don Butler, reporter, Ottawa Citizen, to author (13 February 2012) (on
file with author).
98. Butler, supra note 95.
99.  Ibid.
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the methodology of assessing the ideology of judges using a panel of
experts is questionable. Judges who, in the experience of the panel, have
more frequently denied applications are likely to be viewed as more
“conservative” by such a panel, so what is actually being measured is
not “ideology” but the judge’s past practice. Drawing conclusions about
Francophone judges being more “skeptical” than their Anglophone
counterparts is also problematic: how do we know, for example, whether
these differences are attributable to the predilections of these two
groups of judges or to patterns in the applications presented to the two
groups? What if, for example, there is varying quality in terms of legal
representation in Anglophone and Francophone communities—perhaps
as a result of differing provincial legal aid policies in Quebec and Ontario?
Finally, the Butler study, while once again suggesting that variability
across judges continues to be a concern, also has methodological
limitations. Unlike the two earlier studies, Butler did not consult court
files but examined online reasons for decisions. Because reasons are
not typically provided for leave decisions, the study dealt only with
decisions on the merits—and even then, only when reasons for decisions
were issued, which, as noted above, is not always the case. Also, Butler
calculated grant rates for individual judges based on small datasets, so the
representativeness of the sample is questionable. Moreover, he did not
consider whether there may be systemic factors that account to some
extent for the variations in grant rates for judges from Quebec and the
rest of Canada.100

III. The Present Study
In my view, a new study was needed on whether, after more than two
decades of judicial experience with the leave requirement, the troubling
variability so compellingly established in the Greene study persists.
To overcome some of the methodological limitations of the two more
recent studies discussed above, the new study had to be based on a large
dataset that covered all refugee applications filed over a significant period
of time; had to track outcomes at both the leave and merits stages; and
100. In addition to these methodological limitations, there are concerns about the accuracy
of some of the data in the study. For instance, Barnes J’s political party of appointment was
inaccurately reported, as was the number of cases he decided during the period of the study.
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had to look at the degree to which outcomes vary from judge to judge.
This is the study I have undertaken. To get a more complete picture of
recent decision making at the Federal Court in judicial reviews of refugee
determinations, I have examined all Federal Court cases involving judicial
review of IRB refugee determinations over several years—both leave
decisions and decisions on the merits.
A. Methodology101
To gather the data for the study, a computer program102 was written
to obtain information from the Federal Court’s online Court Index and
Docket103 for all immigration applications filed from 2005 to 2010.104 The
data gathered electronically includes: (1) court number; (2) style of cause;
(3) date the application was filed; (4) office where the application was
filed; and (5) the Court’s categorization of the type and nature of the
proceeding. This produced a database of 40 334 applications.
Then, because the study is only interested in applications for judicial
review of refugee determinations, cases were filtered out where the
Federal Court categorized them as involving matters other than refugee
determinations.105 It should be noted that a number of the cases categorized
by the Federal Court as involving refugee determinations appeared to
101. I am grateful to Sarah L Boyd at Jackman and Associates for drawing my attention
to this methodology.
102. The programming involved coding macros in Microsoft Excel to import data from
the online docket into a spreadsheet.
103. Federal Court, “Court Files”, online: Federal Court <http://www.fct-cf.gc.ca>.
104. The cases were identified using court numbers assigned by the Registrar. All
immigration decisions were given a number in the format IMM-#-yy, where yy is the year
the application was filed and # is the sequential order in which cases are filed in the year.
The court numbers for the cases examined ranged from the first immigration application
filed in 2005 (IMM-1-05) to the last immigration application filed in 2010 (IMM-7726-10).
105. Cases were filtered out unless they were categorized in the online docket as: “Imm–
Appl. for leave & jud. review–IRB—Refugee”. The other categories the Federal Court
uses in the online docket are: “File cancelled—Immigration”; “Imm–Actions / Other
(non-leave) proceedings”; "Imm–Appl. for leave & jud. review—Arising outside Canada”;
Imm–Appl. for leave & jud. review–IRB—Immigration Division”; “Imm–Appl. for leave
& jud. review–IRB—Refugee”; “Imm–Appl. for leave & jud. review–IRB—Immigration
Appeal Division”; “Imm–Appl. for leave & jud. review—Other Arising in Canada”; “Imm–
Appl. for leave & jud. review–Pre-removal risk assessment”; “Imm–Certificate”; “s. 18.1
Application for Judicial Review” and “(blank)”.
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involve other matters (such as H&C applications and PRRAs). These
cases were retained in the dataset.106 In other words, the dataset includes
all applications from 2005 to 2010 that the Federal Court categorized as
involving refugee determinations, whether or not that categorization was
accurate. This produced a database of 23 047 applications.
The next step in the study was for research assistants to manually
review online court dockets for each of the 23 047 applications categorized
as involving a refugee determination. In this review, research assistants
coded information about each application, including (where available):
(1) whether the government was the applicant; (2) whether the application
was perfected; (3) whether the respondent opposed leave; (4) leave judge;
(5) leave outcome; (6) date of leave outcome; (7) JR judge; (8) judicial
review outcome; and (9) date of judicial review outcome. In a few cases,
the outcome was not clear from the online docket, or appeared to be
wrongly recorded. For those cases, where reasons for decisions were
available in online legal databases, the reasons were consulted. Where
reasons for decisions were not available, copies of the relevant court
orders were obtained from the Federal Court Registry.
At the same time, other research assistants gathered data about Federal
Court judges from online sources, including biographies on the Federal
Court’s website107 and Orders-in-Council on the Privy Council Office’s

106. The cases were retained because no means could be devised to exclude them
consistently. Two problems arose in this regard. First, the dockets contained inconsistent
levels of detail—some described the type of application, but most did not. It seemed
problematic to exclude cases where there was enough detail to demonstrate erroneous
categorization, when other cases were also likely to have been erroneously categorized
but such errors were not visible in the dockets because less detail was provided. Second,
early attempts to have research assistants code whether cases involved matters other
than RPD decisions show that this required relatively complex judgment calls that were
difficult to standardize, leading to inconsistent results across coders. For example, an early
docket entry might indicate that the case involved an H&C application, but a subsequent
docket might suggest that the case involved an RPD decision. How should such cases be
categorized? In the end, retaining all the cases categorized by the registrar as involving RPD
decisions seemed preferable to inconsistently excluding cases, especially because the size of
the dataset meant that the inclusion of occasionally improperly categorized cases seemed
unlikely to significantly impact the results of the study.
107. Federal Court, Judges and Prothonotaries, online: Federal Court <http://www.fctcf.gc.ca>.
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website.108 The data collected for each judge included: (1) gender; (2) date
of appointment; and (3) political party of appointment.109
Data verification, including inter-coder checks, was undertaken to
correct errors in coding throughout the process. When all the coding
and data verification was complete, a random sample of 100 cases was
reviewed, and no coding errors were detected in that review. It should be
noted, however, that no attempt was made to measure the accuracy of the
information in the online Federal Court dockets themselves.
B. Overview of the Dataset
Table 1 provides an overview of outcomes in the 23 047 applications
considered in this study. A few points are worth noting.
First, applications for judicial review in refugee determinations
rarely succeed. Indeed, only 6.35% of all applications for judicial review
involving refugee determinations from 2005 to 2010 ultimately succeeded.
Second, given the low leave grant rate (14.44%), the success rate at the
merits stage in cases where leave is granted (43.98%) is surprisingly high.
Recall that the test for leave is supposed to be very permissive, namely,
leave should be granted unless it is clear that there is no reasonable prospect
that the application will succeed on the merits.110 If only applications
that clearly cannot succeed on the merits fail at the leave stage, and if
the vast majority of applications do not pass that stage, one might expect
success rates on the merits to be lower in cases where leave is granted.
The combination of low leave-granting rates and high success rates once

108. Privy Council Office, Orders in Council Database, online: Privy Council Office
<http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca>.
109. Political party of appointment was calculated based on the political party of the
Prime Minister on the date of first appointment to the federal courts. Some judges had
previously been appointed to other courts (including courts where judges are federally
appointed), but those prior appointments were not used for the purpose of determining
political party of appointment.
110. See text accompanying notes 31–41.
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leave is granted may lead one to wonder whether leave is too often being
withheld in cases where there is some modest prospect of success.111
Third, the vast majority of applications (99.42%) are made by claimants
seeking to challenge negative refugee determinations, rather than by the
Minister seeking to challenge positive refugee determinations. When the
Minister does bring an application, however, it is much more likely to
succeed. Applications by the Minister are 4.14 times as likely to be granted
leave (58.65%) than are applications brought by unsuccessful refugee
claimants (14.18%). While applications brought by the Minister are also
more likely to succeed on judicial review after leave has been granted
(62.82%) than applications brought by unsuccessful refugee claimants
(43.53%), the difference is not as pronounced (1.44 times as likely to
succeed). Still, overall, applications brought by the Minister from 2005 to
2010 were ultimately successful in overturning the refugee determination
36.84% of the time, whereas the equivalent figure for applications brought
by unsuccessful claimants was only 6.18%.
Fourth, it is apparent that many applications for leave are never
considered on their merits. For example, a significant proportion of
applications (20.24%) are denied leave without having been perfected. This
means that the applicant in those cases—almost always an unsuccessful
refugee claimant—did not file an application record justifying the
application, so the application was rejected without being considered
by the leave judge. Similarly, in a few cases (2.15%) the application was
withdrawn by the applicant before a leave decision was made, which again
means that the application was never considered by a judge.112
111. Some might respond that this reasoning presumes a normal distribution of likelihood
of success across cases, whereas likelihood of success may in fact follow some other pattern.
For example, even setting aside unperfected cases, perhaps there is a large proportion of
clearly unfounded claims and a significant proportion of claims which have a good prospect
of success, with very few in between. In such circumstances, low leave rates combined
with high success rates in cases where leave is granted would not be unexpected. In my
view, however, the findings reflected in Table 2 suggest that there are a large number
of borderline cases—that is to say, cases where some judges would deny leave on the
basis of no reasonable prospect of success, while others would disagree and grant leave.
If such borderline cases were consistently granted leave, leave rates would be higher and
(presumably) success rates on the merits where leave is granted would be lower.
112. The frequency of unperfected applications raises a question for future research: are
the rates at which applications are unperfected or withdrawn influenced by whether the
applicant had legal representation?
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Finally, leave was granted unopposed in a small number of cases
(1.81%), meaning that the respondent (usually the Minister) consented
to the application, or indicated no opposition to leave being granted,
or simply failed to file a memorandum of argument opposing leave. It
should be noted that in a handful of cases, leave was denied despite the
lack of opposition by the respondent.113 In some cases, judicial review
was granted at the merits stage on consent (9.22% of cases where leave
was granted). Also, in some cases, the application was withdrawn after
leave was given (4.27% of cases where leave was given)—although it is not
clear that this means the application necessarily failed. For example, the
application may have been withdrawn because the applicant was granted
permanent residence in Canada through other immigration procedures,
such as an H&C application.
Because the present study is mainly interested in how the leave
requirement operates and whether outcomes vary from judge to judge,
the remainder of the data presented focuses only on perfected applications
(because all judges will similarly deny unperfected applications), on
applications where the judge deciding the case is identified (which
eliminates cases withdrawn before the leave determination and a few
cases where the name of the judge was not indicated in the online court
docket), and on applications brought by unsuccessful refugee claimants
(because applications brought by the Minister are exceptional, and raise a
different set of issues than applications brought by claimants).
C. Grant Rates for Leave Judges
The most remarkable finding of the study is the enormous variation in
the leave grant rates of judges in perfected applications brought by refugee
claimants, which can be seen in Table 2. For example, Campbell J granted
leave in 77.97% of the applications he decided, whereas Crampton J (now
the Chief Justice) granted leave only 1.36% of the time. In other words,
113. See e.g. Bibi v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (10 October 2006), IMM4043-06, online: Federal Court <http://www.fct-cf.gc.ca>; Vasquez et al v Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration (07 April 2005), IMM-687-05, online: Federal Court <http://
www.fct-cf.gc.ca>; Mazunder v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (07 April 2005),
IMM-3059-05, online: Federal Court <http://www.fct-cf.gc.ca>; Rochester v Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration (26 July 2005), IMM-3062-05, online: Federal Court <http://
www.fct-cf.gc.ca>.
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though both judges decided over 200 applications, refugee claimants were
an incredible 57.33 times as likely to obtain leave from Campbell J as from
Crampton J. It should be noted that Campbell J was clearly an outlier,
with a leave grant rate 2.31 times as high as anyone else (Shore J was
second at 33.71%). Nonetheless, 20 judges had leave grant rates more than
ten times as high as Crampton J, and six had rates more than ten times as
high as Near J (2.50%), who had the second lowest leave grant rate.
In addition to the surprisingly large variations in leave grant rates
between judges, it should also be noted that those rates follow a largely
linear distribution (for the shape of the distribution, see Chart 1). Rather
than most judges having leave grant rates near the average of 16.38% and
only a few judges deviating substantially from that mean (which would be
a standard distribution), a substantial proportion had rates that departed
significantly from the average. Indeed, 36% of judges deviated by more
than 50% from the average.114
Another key finding of the study is that the identity of the leave judge
has a strong effect on the likelihood that an application will ultimately
succeed (that the first instance refugee determination will be overturned
on judicial review). Thus, for example, in 21.43% of the cases where
Campbell J decided the leave applications, the refugee determination
was ultimately overturned by the Federal Court, whereas the equivalent
figure for Near J was 2.45%. Similarly, when Russell J was the leave judge,
15.60% of applications ultimately succeeded, but for Noël J the equivalent
figure was only 2.97%. In fact, when the judge deciding leave was among
those with the ten highest grant rates (deciding 50 or more applications),
the ultimate success rate was 12.19%, while for those with the ten lowest
grant rates, the ultimate success rate was 3.38%. In other words, applicants
were 3.61 times as likely to succeed in overturning a first-instance refugee
decision when leave was decided by a judge whose leave grant rate was in
the top ten than when it was decided by one in the bottom ten.
Interestingly, although applicants generally did better when their
applications were assigned to judges with higher leave grant rates, this
114. Treating a deviation of more than 50% from the average as a criterion for identifying
outliers in judicial decision making has been described in other studies as a “very tolerant
standard of consistency” that some might argue “tolerates too much deviation”. See Jaya
Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I Schoenholtz & Philip G Schrag, “Refugee Roulette: Disparities
in Asylum Adjudication” (2007) 60:2 Stan L Rev 295 at 312–13.
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was not always the case. For instance, Shore J’s leave grant rate (33.71%)
was 3.67 times as high as Layden-Stevenson J’s (9.22%), but an applicant
was actually more likely to succeed in overturning a first-instance
refugee determination when Layden-Stevenson J decided leave (11.91%)
than when Shore J decided leave (9.33%). Similarly, even though Zinn J
(20.57%) was almost twice as likely to grant leave as Gibson J (10.81%),
an application was slightly more likely to succeed when Gibson J was the
leave judge (9.71%) than when Zinn J was the leave judge (8.47%). Some
leave judges would therefore appear to be better than others at picking
cases that will ultimately succeed on the merits.
D. Grant Rates for Judicial Review Judges
As can be seen in Table 3, there are also massive disparities in grant
rates among judges who decide applications on the merits, after leave
has been granted. In other words, the identity of the JR judge is also a
key factor in the ultimate success of an application for judicial review
(although it is, of course, a factor that only comes into play in the
relatively few applications that succeed at the leave stage). Some JR judges
grant judicial review on the merits in most of the applications they decide,
such as Campbell J (92.31%) and Hansen J (72.97%). Others do so much
less frequently, including Boivin J (7.89%) and Blais J (13.33%).
Some of the judges who are outliers when deciding leave are also outliers
when they serve as JR judges deciding cases on their merits. This includes,
at the high end, Campbell J (leave: 77.97%; JR: 92.31%) and O’Keefe J
(leave: 25.91%; JR: 66.32%), and at the low end, Crampton J (leave: 1.36%;
JR: 18.60%) and Boivin J (leave: 6.47%; JR 7.89%). Interestingly, however,
this is not always the case. For example, Shore J has an unusually high
leave grant rate (33.71%), and a below-average JR grant rate (33.81%).
Similarly, Harrington J has an unusually low leave grant rate (6.18%), but
only a slightly below-average JR grant rate (35.96%).
E. Judge Demographics
Table 4 breaks down results in applications, at both the leave stage and
the JR stage, based on demographic characteristics of the deciding judge at
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each stage. Specifically, it shows grant rates broken down by the political
party that appointed the judge and by his or her gender.
There are differences, at both stages, between the grant rates of male
and female judges, with male leave judges slightly more likely to grant
leave (16.52%) as compared to female leave judges (15.85%), and female
JR judges somewhat more likely to grant JR on the merits (42.88%) as
compared to male JR judges (38.78%).115 However, these differences are
quite small—and it has to be kept in mind that the average grant rates
are sensitive to outliers. For example, if Campbell J’s leave decisions are
taken out of the analysis, the leave grant rates for male leave judges drops
to 15.48%.
There are more substantial differences, again at both the leave stage
and the JR stage, between grant rates of judges appointed by Liberal
Party prime ministers (Liberal PMs) and by Progressive Conservative
and Conservative Party prime ministers (Conservative PMs). Leave
judges appointed by Liberal PMs were 1.60 times as likely to grant
leave (17.64%) than their counterparts appointed by Conservative PMs
(11.00%). Similarly, in cases where leave was granted, JR judges appointed
by Liberal PMs were 1.46 times as likely to grant judicial review on the
merits (42.69%) than JR judges appointed by Conservative PMs (29.14%).
It should be noted, however, that variations in grant rates among
individual judges appointed by PMs from the same political party were
more pronounced than variations between judges appointed by PMs from
different parties. For example, the leave grant rates of Blais J (3.10%),
Harrington J (6.18%), Shore J (33.71%) and Campbell J (77.97%) vary
enormously even though they were all appointed by Liberal PMs.
F. Factors Accounting for Variability
While the variations in grant rates between judges are very large, a
number of factors might partly account for these variations. For example,
applications brought in one part of the country may be better founded
than applications brought in other areas, so judges deciding applications
from different parts of the country might justifiably have different grant
115. It should also be noted that the Federal Court bench has not yet achieved gender
parity. As Table 4 shows, 78.01% of perfected applications for leave were decided by male
leave judges, and 81.59% of cases decided on the merits were heard by male JR judges.
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rates. This might happen if there were differences in the quality of legal
representation in various cities (maybe because of varying legal aid
policies), or if first-instance decision-makers at the RPD in different cities
were more or less likely to make reviewable errors.
As can be seen in Table 5, the city where an application is filed does
seem to make an important difference (though the table does not explain
why this would be the case). Most applications (92.93%) are filed in either
Toronto or Montreal. Applicants were 1.42 times as likely to get leave in
Toronto (17.73%) as in Montreal (12.52%). Similarly, in cases where leave
was granted, applicants were 1.78 times as likely to succeed on the merits
in Toronto (45.01%) as in Montreal (25.33%).
However, as Table 6 indicates, even when one looks at applications
filed in only one city, variations in grant rates across judges remain.
For example, in applications filed in Toronto, Finckenstein J (1.27%),
Crampton J (1.64%) and Near J (2.17%) granted leave very infrequently,
whereas Campbell J (78.61%), Shore J (41.22%) and Bedard J (36.36%)
were much more likely to grant leave. It would therefore appear that
the city where the application was filed cannot account for the massive
variations in grant rates across judges.
Another factor that could potentially explain part of the variation
in grant rates is the point in time when an application was filed. For
example, over time, first-instance RPD decision makers might be more
or less likely to commit reviewable errors. Or major changes in the law
might have made the Federal Court more or less deferential toward
administrative tribunals. During the period of the study, the Supreme
Court decision in Dunsmuir significantly modified standards of review in
administrative law,116 so it may be that judges deciding cases mostly before
or mostly after that decision would have different grant rates.
Table 7, however, shows that there is no consistent trend in grant
rates—at either the leave or merits stages—over the period of the study. It
would, therefore, seem that the point in time when a judge made his or
her decisions does not account for variations in grant rates found in the
study.
Table 8 provides further support for this conclusion. JR grant rates
in cases where leave was granted were somewhat higher in applications
filed before Dunsmuir (42.42%) than after (36.14%). But leave grant
116.  Supra note 45.
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rates actually increased slightly (from 16.08% to 16.73%) in the period
after Dunsmuir. These competing trends suggest that Dunsmuir likely
did not have a straightforward or significant impact on the outcomes of
applications.
We can thus reject the hypothesis that variations in grant rates can be
explained by whether a judge decided most of his or her cases before or
after Dunsmuir.
It appears, then, that neither the time nor location of the judicial review
application accounts for the extreme variability in leave and JR grant
rates across judges. Moreover, recall that cases are randomly assigned to
leave judges without being screened on the merits by the registrar.117 This
means that, at least as between leave judges who decided large numbers
of cases, it is unlikely that other factors which may affect the likelihood
of success on individual applications (such as the identity of the RPD
first-instance decision-maker or the quality of particular counsel) could
account for variations in the rate at which those judges granted leave.

IV. Discussion
The central finding of the study is that leave decisions hinge partly
on which judge is assigned to decide the application. There were massive
unexplained variations in leave grant rates; at the extremes, one particular
judge was 50 times as likely to grant leave as another particular judge. It
seems clear that some applications which could well succeed before most
JR judges are prevented from reaching the merits stage by the fact that
some leave judges are predisposed to deny leave. This is deeply troubling
in light of the fact that leave decisions are the determinative step in the
vast majority of applications (only 14.18% of applications get leave), and
the fact that a large proportion of applications that pass the leave stage end
up succeeding on the merits (43.98%), even though the leave requirement
is supposed to screen out only clearly unfounded applications. Moreover,
it should be recalled that leave determinations involve a process that
is both opaque (in that reasons are not usually provided when leave is
denied) and final (in that there is no appeal from a leave determination).
And, of course, there are extreme stakes in this decision-making process:
117. See Greene & Shaffer, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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if the Federal Court wrongly denies applications, the direct result is that
refugees may, contrary to international refugee law, be sent back to
countries where they face persecution, torture or death. In short, the key
finding of the study is that the leave requirement, as currently applied,
all too often poses an arbitrary and unfair barrier to access to justice for
refugees, with potentially devastating consequences.
Before moving on to the policy implications of that central finding,
three other findings of the study are worth highlighting.
First, there is dramatic variability in grant rates among JR judges at the
merits stage—from a minimum of 7.89% to a maximum of 92.31%. This
variability demonstrates a remarkable lack of consensus on refugee law at
the Federal Court.118 To be sure, variability in grant rates at the merits stage
has less of an impact on most claimants than variability at the leave stage,
because most applications never reach the merits stage. Nonetheless, it is
worth thinking further about whether the structure of judicial review in
refugee matters needs to be revised to bring more consistency to decisions
on the merits. In particular, one wonders whether restrictions on appeal
rights in cases decided on the merits should be reconsidered. As noted
earlier, a decision on the merits can only be appealed to the Federal Court
of Appeal if the JR judge issuing that decision certifies a question for
appeal. Perhaps consistency in decision making on the merits would be
enhanced if, rather than a certification requirement, there was an appeal
as of right or with leave of the Federal Court of Appeal.119
Second, the study shows that although an adjudicator’s gender
appeared to have some effect on outcomes, that effect was not consistent
or straightforward: male judges were slightly more likely than female
judges to grant leave, but less likely to grant judicial review on the merits.
Moreover, the effects of a judge’s gender are quite small. This finding is
interesting, in part because a large-scale study of refugee determinations
in the US found that adjudicator gender has a surprisingly large impact
118. This is not a new phenomenon. For an analysis of the lack of consistency in the
application of refugee law by the Federal Court in the early 1990s, see Mary C Hurley,
“Principles, Practices, Fragile Promises: Judicial Review of Refugee Determination
Decisions Before the Federal Court of Canada” (1996) 41:2 McGill LJ 317.
119. For further discussion of the certification requirement, see Gerald P Heckman,
“Unfinished Business: Baker and the Constitutionality of the Leave and Certification
Requirements under the Immigration Act” (2002) 27:2 Queen’s LJ 683 [Heckman, “Baker”];
Hurley, supra note 118.
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on outcomes, with male immigration judges much less sympathetic to
applicants than female immigration judges.120 This finding suggests that
one must be cautious about inferring differences in how men and women
engage in judging or moral reasoning from studies that find gender
difference in specific adjudicative settings. Such reasoning must explain
why these differences are not apparent in other contexts.121
Third, the study indicates that judges appointed by Liberal PMs
are more likely to grant leave and to grant judicial review than judges
appointed by Conservative PMs—though there was much more variation
between individual judges appointed by PMs from either party than
between the two groups. This finding is, of course, not surprising. The
current Conservative government has clearly indicated a desire for
increased deference from the Federal Court on immigration and refugee
matters. In fact, the current Minister, Jason Kenney, recently chided the
Federal Court in these terms: “[S]eemingly on a whim, or perhaps in a
fit of misguided magnanimity, a judge overturns the careful decisions of
multiple levels of diligent, highly trained public servants, tribunals, and
even other judges. . . . [S]uch decisions do serious harm to the overall
immigration system and prevent it from doing more good for deserving
immigrants. And they undermine public confidence in the government’s
ability to enforce our laws as passed by Parliament, and therefore
in the entire system. . . . We’ve made some necessary changes to the
system . . . [b]ut we legislators are not an island, and we don’t act alone.
We need the judiciary to understand the spirit of what we are trying to
do”.122
In light of such comments, it seems unremarkable that Conservative
PMs might seek to appoint judges who are seen as likely to share their
policy preferences, and in particular are more likely to defer to refugee

120. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag supra note 114 at 342ff.
121. For a further discussion of gender and adjudication in the refugee context, and
the danger of generalizing from findings of gender differences in adjudication in specific
settings, see Rehaag, “Gender”, supra note 15.
122. (Address delivered at the Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario, 11
February 2011), online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada Media Centre <http://
www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media>.
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decisions made by the IRB.123 Still, once appointed, judges are independent,
and they typically understand their role not as making policy choices
but as fairly applying the law to the best of their ability, so their actual
behaviour on the bench may be difficult to predict in advance. Indeed,
the Minister’s comments turned out to be highly controversial, in part
because they showed little respect for judicial independence. As Audrey
Macklin and Lorne Waldman put it:
[J]udges are supposed to be independent of government, and government is supposed to
respect that independence. The executive appoints our judges. But once they’re appointed,
our democracy requires that they render their decisions free from government influence
or pressure. . . . When Mr. Kenney publicly criticizes judges for interpreting the law in a
manner that diverges from his own preferred outcome, he shows contempt for judicial
independence.124

There is an important caution that one should take away from this. While
the present study shows that inconsistent decision making in judicial
review of refugee determinations is a serious problem, any attempt to deal
with these inconsistencies needs to be respectful of judicial independence.
For this reason it would in my view be a mistake to focus too heavily
on the fact that judges appointed by different political parties may, on
average, be more or less likely to decide in favour of applicants (especially
given the variations between judges appointed by a particular political
party). Absent exceptional circumstances, we should generally resist the
temptation to argue that judges whose grant rates are higher or lower
than average provoke a reasonable apprehension of bias and should recuse
themselves from hearing applications for judicial review in the refugee
123. Many would argue that this is a perfectly legitimate feature of representative
democracy. See e.g. Macdonald & Scott, supra note 62 (“[o]nce a candidate has been
certified as competent by the expert selection committee, it is not offensive to democratic
constitutional theory for governments to appoint judges who are on the same general
policy page as they are” at 38).
124. “When cabinet ministers attack judges, they attack democracy” The Globe and Mail
(18 February 2011) A17, online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.
com>. See also Letter from Rod Snow, President of the Canadian Bar Association, to
Jason Kenney, Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism (22 February
2011), online: Canadian Bar Association <http://www.cba.org>; Richard Foot, “Chief
Justice supports criticism of Kenney”, National Post (13 August 2011), online: National
Post <http://www.nationalpost.com>.
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law context, or that their decisions should be overturned on this basis.125
Instead, we should focus on whether there are institutional impediments
to consistent decision making in this area of judicial review—and if so,
what might be done about it. I will now turn to a discussion of possible
reforms to address these concerns.
A. Abolishing the Leave Requirement
Perhaps the most obvious way to reduce arbitrary limits on access to
justice for refugees would be to abolish the leave requirement.
This requirement has been controversial since it was first introduced in
1987 as part of a package of reforms to the refugee determination process.126
Part of the reason for the controversy is that the leave requirement was
(and is) an unprecedented limit on access to first-instance judicial review
of administrative decision making in Canada. William Angus, then at
Osgoode Hall Law School, testified before a parliamentary committee
considering proposed legislation that included the leave requirement, and
offered the following assessment:
I come finally to . . . the limitations placed on access to the courts. . . . I think that the
courts are going to look very closely at these provisions and that Parliament, if these
provisions pass in their present form, is not going to get away with it. . . .
125. Courts have regularly held that statistical differences in outcomes are not sufficient
on their own to ground a finding of reasonable apprehension of bias. See e.g. Es-Sayyid v
Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FCA 59, 432 NR 261;
Jaroslav v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2011 FC 634 at paras 53–57, 390
FTR 248; Dunova v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 438, [2010]
FCJ No 511 (QL); Zrig v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 1043
at para 130, [2002] 1 FC 559. Judicial reluctance to find reasonable apprehension of bias
based on mere statistics is understandable. However there are, in my view, exceptional
circumstances where statistical evidence is so overwhelming that it meets the test for a
reasonable apprehension of bias. See e.g. Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 SCC 45
at para 60, [2003] 2 SCR 259. This might be the case where, for example, reliable evidence
shows that a judge never—or almost never—grants particular types of applications, despite
having decided a large number of them, and that other judges frequently grant those types
of applications.
126.  An Act to amend the Immigration Act, 1976, 2nd Sess, 33rd Parl, 1987, s 19 (assented
to 21 July 1988). For a discussion of the broader revisions to the refugee determination
system, see Law Reform Commission of Canada, The Determination of Refugee Status in
Canada: A Review of the Procedure (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1992).

34

(2012) 38:1 Queen’s LJ

I have not seen—there may be a precedent somewhere, but I have not seen it, and I think
it is unprecedented—a situation where access to the courts, not by way of an appeal, which
you only get by statute, but by way of judicial review. . . . I have not seen where the timehonoured, traditional remedies that have been present for centuries are limited whereby
you have to get leave of a judge even to have your access to the traditional prerogative
writs. . . . This is [a] most extraordinary provision, which might be appropriate for an
authoritarian state, but is completely inappropriate for a democracy such as we have in
Canada, in which we have a system for the rule of law.127

Others disagreed. John Frecker, then a commissioner at the Law Reform
Commission of Canada, said to the same parliamentary committee:
[T]he pattern that is emerging—and it is as much of a trend problem as a gross caseload
problem at this instant—in the immigration appeal area is that the court could be choked.
One way the court can control that is by having a requirement that application to the
court in the problem area . . . be by leave. . . . The question is does the court have, as a
matter of fairness, to hear every appeal that is put to it? My answer [is] that there is no
principle in law that says that a court has to, as a matter of fairness, hear every appeal from
an administrative tribunal.128

The proponents of a leave requirement won the day, and the requirement
was brought into effect in 1989.129 However, the controversy did not end
there.
Greene, relying on his empirical study of all leave decisions involving
refugee matters in 1990, concluded that the leave requirement imposed
arbitrary limits on access to judicial review: “applicants for leave . . . are
denied fundamental justice . . . because they do not have an equal
chance of convincing the judge that their application for leave ought to
be granted”.130A few years later, Mary Hurley, in an article offering a
qualitative assessment of inconsistencies in early Federal Court refugee
jurisprudence, called the leave requirement “a genuine refugee’s black

127. House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee
on Bill C-55, 33rd Parl, 2nd Sess, (4 September 1987) at 7:11.
128. House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee
on Bill C-55, 33rd Parl, 2nd Sess, (8 September 1987) at 8:155–56.
129. For a discussion of the introduction of the leave requirement and its institutional
development during the 1990s, see Hurley, supra note 118 at 332–36.
130. Greene & Shaffer, supra note 27 at 82.
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hole”131 and “a lottery-like process”.132 More recently, Gould, Sheppard
and Wheeldon’s study of Federal Court decisions made in 2003—including
leave decisions—echoed Greene’s results, finding that outcomes were
influenced by “a number of extra legal, indeed inappropriate, factors”,
and concluding that “the Canadian system of immigration and refugee
determination has significant flaws”.133
The present study further confirms these findings, this time with
a large dataset that covers the full Federal Court refugee law caseload
over a five-year period. When preliminary results of this study were first
released, Lorne Waldman and Audrey Macklin suggested that they raised
serious concerns about the arbitrary application of the leave requirement:
[P]ublic confidence in the courts depends in part on our faith that judges make principled
and reasoned decisions. The adage that justice not only be done, but seen to be done,
underscores the importance of transparency in maintaining that confidence. The leave
process is the opposite of transparent: apart from the requirement that the refugee
claimant present an ‘arguable case’, there are no criteria, no process, and judges never issue
reasons for refusing leave. No one except the judges knows what makes a case worthy of
being heard, and the enormous statistical variation among judges suggests that they don’t
agree among themselves anyway. Arbitrariness—even the appearance of arbitrariness—is
antithetical to fairness. Access to justice for refugee claimants should not look like a lottery.
It does a disservice to refugee claimants and, to the extent that it undermines confidence in
the judiciary, does a disservice to the judiciary, too.134

It seems, then, that over the more than 20 years that the leave requirement
has been in effect, no consistent practice has developed which would
adequately address the critique that the process creates arbitrary limits
on access to the court for refugees—a critique that has been repeatedly
substantiated by empirical studies. It may simply be time to abolish the
leave requirement.135
131. Supra note 118 at 363.
132.  Ibid at 364.
133. Greene, supra note 27 at 482.
134. “Access to justice should not look like a lottery”, The Ottawa Citizen (29 November
2011) A13, online: Ottawa Citizen <http://www.ottawacitizen.com>.
135. It should be noted that abolishing the leave requirement would not necessarily mean
that frivolous applications for judicial review would proceed to a hearing, as procedures are
available in the Federal Court for summary disposition of clearly unfounded applications,
including motions to strike. See Federal Courts Rules, supra note 29, s 221.
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Abolishing the leave requirement would have significant resource
implications. The complement of Federal Court judges would need to be
substantially expanded in order to hold a much larger number of hearings
on the merits for applications for judicial review of refugee determinations
in a timely manner. In addition, expenses for counsel would likely increase,
both for the Department of Justice and for provincial legal aid programs.
However, the same could be said about other changes that have improved
the fairness of Canada’s refugee determination system. For example, it
was clear that the Supreme Court’s decision in Singh v Canada (Minister
of Empoyment and Immigration),136 which mandated oral hearings in
refugee claims where credibility was at stake, would have similar kinds of
resource implications, yet the Court did not hesitate to find that fairness
in life-and-death decision-making processes should not be compromised
by those considerations.137
Unfortunately, given the current Conservative government’s focus
on expediting the refugee determination process, it is highly unlikely
that the leave requirement will be abolished through legislation in the
near future.138 As a result, the only way to remove it would be through
constitutional litigation.
A constitutional challenge would, however, confront a number
of hurdles. Most notably, the leave requirement has survived past
constitutional challenges. The leading and oft-cited case is Bains.139 In
this five-paragraph decision from 1990, the Federal Court of Appeal
set out the test for when leave should be granted, and noted that it was
essentially the same as the test applied on a motion to strike (namely, that
there was “no reasonably arguable case”).140 The Court then considered
the constitutionality of the leave provision: “The requirement of leave
does not deny refugee claimants access to the Court. The right to apply
for leave is itself a right of access to the Court and, in our opinion, the
requirement that leave be obtained before an appeal or application for
judicial review may proceed does not impair rights guaranteed refugee

136.  Supra note 5.
137.  Ibid at 218–21.
138. See supra notes 127–29 (and accompanying text).
139.  Bains, supra note 31.
140.  Ibid at para 3.
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claimants under either s. 7 or s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms”.141
The Federal Court of Appeal revisited the matter in 2001 in Krishnapillai
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), a case which involved
an appeal of a successful motion to strike a statement of claim challenging
the constitutionality of the leave requirement.142 In that case, the Court
held that the matter had already been largely decided in Bains.143 The only
constitutional issue that it found had not already been explicitly resolved
in Bains was whether the “failure to impose an obligation to give reasons
when denying leave” was unconstitutional.144 The Court’s reasons were
succinct: “That neither the Court nor counsel seemed to be concerned
with [the] practice [of denying leave without giving reasons] is hardly
surprising. It was then settled law that judicial decisions are not subject to
the requirement of giving formal reasons and in my view nothing which
was said in Baker at paragraph 35 ff. with respect to the requirement that
in certain circumstances reasons be provided for administrative decisions,
leads to the import of such a requirement with respect to judicial decisions
denying leave to seek judicial review. The attack on the constitutionality
of the leave requirement prescribed by section 82.1 of the Immigration
Act has no chance of success”.145
These brief passages from Bains and Krishnapillai, which constitute
the totality of the jurisprudence on the subject, hardly represent a full
judicial analysis of the constitutionality of the leave requirement. The
more recent of these two cases is more than ten years old, and the Supreme
Court has never decided the issue. In addition, even assuming that Bains
and Krishnapillai are still correct and that the leave requirement does not,
in principle, violate constitutional norms, an argument can be made that
the arbitrary application of the leave requirement by the Federal Court
does violate constitutional norms, and in particular, the right not to be
deprived of life, liberty or security of the person except in accordance
141.  Ibid at para 4.
142.  [2002] 3 FC 74 at para 24ff, 2001 FCA 378.
143.  Ibid.
144. The Court did look, in somewhat more detail (i.e. 13 paragraphs), at the question of
whether the leave requirement complies with international refugee law. The Court found
that it did. (ibid at paras 20–33).
145.  Ibid at paras 35–36 [footnotes omitted].
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with a process that complies with the principles of fundamental justice.146
In my view, advocates for refugees should seriously consider a new
constitutional challenge to the leave requirement, given the importance
of the matter to both individual refugee claimants and to Canada’s refugee
determination process, the brevity and age of the existing jurisprudence
and the substantial empirical evidence that the Federal Court has been
applying the leave requirement arbitrarily.147
B. Reforming the Leave Requirement
In the alternative, if the leave requirement is not abolished, there are
institutional reforms that would be worth considering in order to enhance
consistency in leave decisions.
One such reform would be for leave judges to issue reasons when denying
leave. This would have at least three advantages. First, it would enhance
transparency and would assure parties that their arguments had been fully
considered.148 Second, it would establish an extensive jurisprudence on
when leave should be denied, allowing more comprehensive and coherent

146.  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. There are many different
directions that such a fundamental justice argument could take, and it is beyond the scope
of this article to explore those in detail.
147.  In addition to litigation surrounding constitutional due process norms, it would
be worth considering constitutional equality norms and international norms on access
to independent courts. For excellent discussions, see Heckman, “Baker”, supra note 119;
Gerald P Heckman, Prospects for Narrowing the Gap Between Domestic and International
Institutional and Procedural Safeguards in Canadian, American and Australian Refugee
Protection Decisionmaking (PhD Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, 2008) [unpublished];
Gerald P Heckman, “Canada’s Refugee Status Determination System and the International
Norm of Independence” (2009) 25:2 Refuge 79.
148.  R v REM, 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 SCR 3, (“[r]easons tell the parties affected by the
decision why the decision was made [ . . . and reasons] provide accountability of the judicial
decision; justice is not only done, but is seen to be done” at para 11). See also Lon L Fuller,
“The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92:2 Harv L Rev 353 (“[b]y and large it
seems clear that the fairness and effectiveness of adjudication are promoted by reasoned
opinions. Without such opinions the parties have to take it on faith that their participation
in the decision has been real, that the arbiter has in fact understood and taken into account
their proofs and arguments” at 388).
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standards to be developed through precedent.149 Third, the act of writing
reasons itself can enhance consistency by disciplining judicial reasoning.150
However, giving reasons would only serve those purposes if the
reasons engaged meaningfully with the arguments presented by the
applicant and the respondent. Because the Court must decide a very large
number of leave applications, and because some leave judges may doubt
the utility of reasons where there is no appeal, there is a real risk that only
cursory reasons would be given. It is also questionable whether limited
resources should be put into issuing thousands of reasons for denying
leave each year, rather than putting those same resources into deciding
more applications on the merits.
A more promising option for institutional reform would be to have
leave decisions made by more than one judge. This could take at least
two forms. First, leave could be decided by panels of two judges, either of
whom could grant leave but both of whom would need to agree in order
to deny leave—if one judge thought that there was a reasonably arguable
case, the applicant should not be denied the right to proceed to a full
hearing, because it would not be clear and obvious that the application had
no prospect of success. Having two judges make leave decisions together
on a panel would not only enhance consistency by reducing the number
of applications where leave is denied because of the predispositions of a
single judge, but it would also provide regular forums for Federal Court
judges to discuss and develop shared understandings about when leave
should be granted.151
Alternatively, an additional judge could reconsider an application for
leave, but only where the first leave judge denied leave. Therefore, once
again, one judge alone could grant leave but it would take two judges to
deny leave. In this model, the second judge could approach the application
for leave on a de novo basis—ideally without knowing that it had already
149. See R v REM, supra note 148 (“reasons are a fundamental means of developing the
law uniformly, by providing guidance to future courts in accordance with the principle of
stare decisis” at para 12).
150.  Ibid (“reasons help ensure fair and accurate decision making; the task of articulating
the reasons directs the judge’s attention to the salient issues and lessens the possibility of
overlooking or under-emphasizing important points of fact or law”).
151. For an argument that dialogue among judges with multiple perspectives can improve
judicial decision making, see Jennifer Nedelsky, “Embodied Diversity and the Challenges
to Law” (1997) 42:1 McGill LJ 91.
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been considered by a first judge. This reform could be undertaken as
either a permanent policy or a pilot project. If it was a pilot project,
data could be gathered by the Federal Court about how often leave was
granted by a second judge, and how often applications where leave was
granted by a second judge went on to succeed on the merits. If it turned
out that few applications succeeded on the merits after leave had been
denied by a first leave judge and granted by a second one, the court could
discontinue the pilot project. If, on the other hand, a significant number
of such applications did succeed on the merits, the pilot project would be
continued.152
Both of these institutional reforms would require additional resources
for the Federal Court. The second of the above reforms has the advantage,
however, that review of an application by a second judge would not be
needed unless the first judge had denied leave. Moreover, if the second
reform was run as a pilot project, it would only need to continue for so
long as the evidence established that it was necessary in order to enhance
consistency in leave determinations. If the Federal Court eventually
developed more consistent practices, the pilot project could be abandoned,
which would facilitate evidence-based resource allocation.
C. Clarifying the Test for Leave
As explained above, the test for when leave should be granted is whether
the applicant has made out a reasonably arguable case—or, inversely,
whether it is clear and obvious that the application has no prospect of
success.153 However, this study shows that there is little consensus in the
Federal Court on how to actually apply the test. Therefore, even in the
absence of any major reform of the process for applying for leave, the test
for granting leave should be clarified to give leave judges more guidance,
which would hopefully reduce inconsistent decision making.

152. I am grateful for the helpful suggestions on this proposed pilot project offered by
Audrey Macklin, Hadayt Nazami, Barbara Jackman, Andrew Brouwer, Lorne Waldman,
Mitchell Goldberg, Donald Galloway, Pia Zambelli and Aviva Basman. I hasten to add that
by listing them here I do not mean to suggest that they necessarily agree with the proposed
pilot project as I have outlined it.
153. See text accompanying notes 31–41.
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It would be particularly helpful, in my view, if appellate courts were to
offer an extended analysis of the test for leave. Any such analysis should
be attentive to the following considerations:154
•• Judicial review in refugee law engages constitutional rights to life,
liberty and security of the person;
•• if the court gets a decision wrong, a refugee may be deported to face
persecution, torture or death;
•• the process must therefore comply with the principles of
fundamental justice, and judges deciding leave should keep these
stakes foremost in mind; and
•• the leave requirement should not be used as an instrument of docket
control.
Applicants for refugee status are entitled to full hearings on the merits,
except where a full hearing would serve no useful purpose because an
application is so clearly without merit that it has no reasonable prospect
of success. The mere fact that an application is likely—or even very
likely—to fail on the merits is not sufficient reason to deny leave. Leave
should only be denied in the clearest of cases.
Leave judges should be mindful that there is substantial disagreement
within the court on refugee law matters, and that they do not know who
the JR judge would be if leave is granted. When evaluating whether an
application has any reasonable prospect of success, a leave judge should
not consider whether the applicant would have any reasonable prospect
for success on the merits if she were the JR judge. What the leave judge
should consider is whether the application will have any reasonable
prospect of success before any judge on the court.
Applications for leave should be read generously, and applicants
should be given the benefit of the doubt. Although the applicant bears
the burden of proof, leave judges should be sensitive to challenges relating
to access to justice and to the difficulties many applicants face in terms of
securing competent counsel—especially at a time when legal aid programs
across Canada are under increasing financial pressure. Where applicants
are unrepresented or appear to be represented by substandard counsel,
leave judges should be especially careful to consider whether the record
154. I am grateful to Lorne Waldman for suggesting a number of these principles.
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discloses a reasonably arguable case, even if the applicant’s memorandum
of argument does not clearly make out such a case.
These principles are admittedly pitched at a high level of abstraction. In
clarifying the test for leave, it may be appropriate to define more precisely
the specific circumstances in which leave should be granted. One way
the court could attempt to develop a more detailed test for leave would
be to encourage leave judges to issue reasons in a range of cases, both
where leave is denied and where it is granted. As these reasoned decisions
accumulated, various criteria would likely emerge, and those criteria could
perhaps be consolidated in an appellate decision. To further this process,
other stakeholders155 could propose guidelines for leave determination,
in the hope of persuading the court to adopt their suggestions. Such a
dialogue between judges, courts and other stakeholders might bring more
clarity to a test that currently brings arbitrary results.
D. Implications of Announced Reforms to the Refugee Determination
System156
While this study has assessed the Federal Court leave requirement
under the refugee determination system as it now stands, it is important
to note that major changes to that system are expected in the near future.
In June 2010, the then-minority Conservative government passed
the Balanced Refugee Reform Act (BRRA),157 which substantially reforms
the refugee determination system.158 Mere days before most BRRA
provisions would have come into effect,159 however, the current majority
155. Stakeholders might include organizations such as the Canadian Association of Refugee
Lawyers, the Canadian Council for Refugees, the Canadian Bar Association’s National
Immigration Law Section, the Barreau du Québec’s Comité en droit de l’immigration et
de la citoyenneté, the Refugee Forum, the Refugee Lawyers Association of Ontario, the
Refugee Law Office, provincial legal aid programs, and legal clinics across Canada.
156. Citations in this section of the paper are up to date as of 15 August 2012.
157. SC 2010, c 8.
158. For a discussion of the BRRA reforms, see Rehaag, “Counsel”, supra note 15 at 77–79;
Erin C Roth, “Is the Proposed Balanced Refugee Reform Act Balanced?” (2010) 86 Imm LR
(3d) 168; David Matas, “Balancing” (2010) 88 Imm LR (3d) 212.
159. Some provisions came into effect immediately on royal assent, but the majority of
the provisions, including those that reformed the refugee determination process, were to
come into effect two years after royal assent (unless an earlier date was fixed by order of the
Governor in Council). See BRRA, supra note 157, s 42.
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Conservative government passed the Protecting Canada’s Immigration
System Act (PCISA),160 which significantly revises the unimplemented
BRRA reforms.161 At the time of writing, most of the combined BRRA
and PCISA reforms are not yet in force and there is no legislative deadline
for that to happen.162 In addition, to fully implement BRRA and PCISA,
regulations and rules of procedure at the IRB will need to be revised—
another task that has not yet been completed.163 Therefore, the precise
content of the reforms to the refugee determination system is still in flux.
That said, for the purposes of assessing the Federal Court judicial
review process, the following are some of the more salient changes
expected to the refugee determination system from the combined BRRA
and PCISA reforms:164
•• The Minister will have the power to differentiate between classes
of refugee claimants, and varying refugee determination procedures
will apply to the different classes. For example, the Minister has the
discretionary authority to:
○○ Designate foreign nationals, including refugee claimants, as
irregular arrivals if they come to Canada in a group and if the
Minister believes that examinations cannot be conducted in a timely
manner or reasonably suspects that they arrived in connection
with certain types of human smuggling;165 and
160. SC 2012, c 17.
161. Confusingly, PCISA does not replace BRRA but instead modifies it. Both acts, in
turn, modify other legislation, including IRPA. To add to the complexity, one needs to
consider the coming into force and transitional provisions in all three acts.
162.  PCISA, supra note 160, s 85.
163. Draft versions of the rules of procedure and some of the relevant regulations have
been published but these are not necessarily the final versions, and further regulatory
changes will be necessary. See Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Canadian Gazette, Vol 146,
No 32 (11 August 2012); Refugee Protection Division Rules, Canadian Gazette, Vol 146,
No 32 (11 August 2012); Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations [Processing Timelines], Canadian Gazette, Vol 146, No 31 (4 August 2012) [Draft
Revised Regulations].
164. For a more comprehensive outline of the reforms, see Julie Béchard & Sandra
Elgersma, “Legislative Summary of Bill C-31” (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2012),
online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca>.
165.  PCISA, supra note 160, s 20.
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○○ designate countries of origin for which success rates in refugee
claims fall below a certain threshold, or if a country produces only
a small number of claims, if the Minister is of the view that the
country meets certain minimal standards of rights protection.166
•• First-instance RPD refugee determinations will be made by civil
servants, rather than governor-in-council appointees serving for fixed
terms, as is currently the case.167
•• RPD members will be required to declare a refugee claim to be
manifestly unfounded if the claim is clearly fraudulent.168 This is in
addition to the existing power to declare a claim to have no credible
basis if there is no credible or trustworthy evidence supporting it.169
Timelines will also be dramatically expedited. Claimants will have to
submit Basis of Claim forms either when they make refugee claims (in the
case of inland claimants) or within 15 days of having their claim referred
to the IRB (in the case of claims made at the port of entry).170 This replaces
the current practice whereby all claimants must complete a Personal
Information Form within 28 days after a claim is referred to the IRB.171
In addition, RPD hearings will be scheduled within 60 days of referral for
regular claimants, within 30 days for inland claimants from designated
countries, and within 45 days for port of entry claimants from designated
countries.172 Under the existing system, in contrast, hearings are generally
not held for several months (and sometimes years) after referral.173
Under the new reforms, some claimants will get access to an appeal
on the merits to the RAD,174 which will be staffed by governor-in-council
166.  Ibid, s 58.
167.  Ibid, s 48.
168.  Ibid, s 57.
169.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 107.
170.  Draft Revised Regulations, supra note 163, s 1 (modifying IRPA Regulations, supra
note 21, s 159.8).
171.  RPD Rules, supra note 10, r 6.
172.  Draft Revised Regulations, supra note 163, s 1 (modifying IRPA Regulations, supra
note 21, s 159.9).
173. In July 2012, the government estimated average processing times prior to RPD
hearings at 19 months. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Backgrounder—
Summary of Changes to Canada’s Refugee System” (29 June 2012), online: Citizenship and
Immigration Canada <http://www.cic.gc.ca> [CIC, “Backgrounder”].
174.  PCISA, supra note 160, s 36.
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appointees.175 However, timelines for appeals will be extremely tight,
with only 15 days to file and perfect an application.176 Moreover, there
will be no access to the RAD for any of the following:
•• Claimants designated as irregular arrivals;
•• claimants from designated countries of origin;
•• claimants whose refugee claims were declared to be manifestly
unfounded;
•• claimants whose refugee claims were declared to have no credible
basis;
•• claimants who came by land from the United States and were
admitted to Canada because they fell within an exception to the Safe
Third Country Agreement;
•• claimants whose claims have been abandoned or withdrawn;
•• claimants whose previously successful refugee claims were vacated
by the RPD due to fraud; or
•• claimants who previously secured refugee protection, but whose
status was removed by the RPD due to cessation procedures.177
Unsuccessful refugee claimants will be able to apply to the Federal
Court for leave for judicial review of RAD decisions, or of RPD decisions
in the case of claimants who are not entitled to access the RAD.178 The
175.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 159.
176.  Draft Revised Regulations, supra note 163, s 1 (modifying IRPA Regulations, supra
note 21, s 159.91).
177.  PCISA, supra note 160, s 36. Accordign to section 108(1) of IRPA, refugees can have
their refugee status removed through cessation procedures where:
(a) the person has voluntarily reavailed themself of the protection of their country
of nationality;
(b) the person has voluntarily re-acquired their nationality;
(c) the person has acquired a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the
country of that new nationality;
(d) the person has voluntarily become re-established in the country that the person
left or remained outside of and in respect of which the person claimed refugee
protection in Canada; or
(e) the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist.
For a discussion of loss of status through cessation, see Jones & Baglay, supra note 1 at
250–52.
178.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 72.
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process for these applications, and the standards to be applied, will
generally remain as they are now. One exception is that most classes of
refugee claimants who are not entitled to access the RAD will no longer
benefit from an automatic stay of removal pending judicial review.179
Access to alternative procedures through which refugee claimants
may seek to remain in Canada will be further restricted. For example,
unsuccessful refugee claimants will be prohibited from accessing H&C
applications or PRRAs for at least one year. For claimants from designated
countries, the restriction on PRRAs lasts for three years, and for claimants
designated as irregular arrivals, the restriction on H&C applications lasts
for five years.180 Meanwhile, removal of unsuccessful refugee claimants
will have to occur “as soon as possible”.181
With regard to these expected reforms, it should be noted that
advocates for refugees have long called for the implementation of an
appeal on the merits of the RAD, partly because of limitations in the
Federal Court judicial review process.182 If the RAD is in fact brought
into existence through the combined BRRA and PCISA reforms, some
might argue that resorting to Federal Court judicial review will no longer
be the only means to catch errors made by a single adjudicator, because
the RAD will at least in some cases be able to do that. This might arguably
lead some to conclude that consistency in Federal Court decision making
in this area (and the troubling findings of the present study) will become
less important.
In my view, however, the opposite conclusion is warranted for several
reasons. First, there are concerns about the new cohort of civil servant
RPD members who will be making first instance refugee determinations.
If the transition is handled properly, this change presents an opportunity
to enhance professionalism and consistency in decision making at the

179. This will require a modification of IRPA Regulations, supra note 21, s 231. For the
announced intention to make this revision, see CIC, “Backgrounder”, supra note 173.
180.  PCISA, supra note 160, ss 13, 38. These provisions have already come into effect. See
IRPA, supra note 3, ss 25, 112.
181.  PCISA, supra note 160, s 20.
182. See note 15 and accompanying text. See also Hurley, supra note 118 at 380–86.

S Rehaag

47

RPD.183 If it is handled incorrectly, the independence of the IRB as a
whole may be compromised. That would be a serious matter, given how
vigorously the current government makes known its doubts about the
bona fides of whole groups of refugee claimants.184 Moreover, regardless of
how well the transition is handled, there will inevitably be a long period
of learning and adjustment for new decision makers, at both the RPD and
RAD levels, and more errors will be made during that period.
Second, the expedited timelines will likely lead to more errors in
refugee adjudication. Errors resulting from unreasonably short time limits
will disproportionately affect the most vulnerable claimants, including
LGBTQ claimants, gender-based claimants and those who have suffered
torture or severe trauma. These types of claimants need the most time to
retain and instruct counsel, to prepare their applications and to prepare
for their refugee hearings.185
183. The existing system whereby RPD members are governor-in-council appointees has
long been criticized, both for the quality of appointees and the frequent use of appointments
for political patronage. For a summary of some of the critiques, see Rehaag, “Troubling”,
supra note 16 at 355–58.
184. See e.g. Clark Campbell, “Minister calls for overhaul of Canada’s refugee system”,
The Globe and Mail (15 July 2009) A1, online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.
theglobeandmail.com>; Nicholas Keung, “Czech Roma to sue board for ‘biases,’ lawyer
says”, Toronto Star (17 July 2009) A12, online: The Star <http://www.thestar.com>;
Jason Kenney, “Canada’s commitment to refugees: Celebrating successes and reflecting
on the challenges ahead” (Speaking Notes, 27 November 2008), online: Citizenship and
Immigration Canada Media Centre <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media>.
185. As Peter Showler, former Chair of the IRB, testifying before the Parliamentary
committee considering these reforms, stated: “In regard to the [revised] refugee claim process
itself, I must say candidly that the time limits are simply too short and will undermine
its fairness and its efficiency”. House of Commons, Evidence at the Standing Committee
on Citizenship and Immigration, 41st Parl, 1st Sess (30 April 2012) (Peter Showler) at
1540. See also Canadian Bar Association, National Immigration Law Section, “Bill C-31:
Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act” (April 2012), Brief submitted to the Standing
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration at 2–4, 16–19, 22–23, online: The Canadian
Bar Association <http://www.cba.org> [CBA, “Bill C-31 Brief”]; Canadian Council for
Refugees, “Bill C31—Diminishing Refugee Protection” (April 2012), Brief submitted to the
Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration at 9, online: Canadian Council for
Refugees <http://ccrweb.ca>; Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, “Fair Refugee
Outcomes Depend on Fair Processes” (April 2012), Brief submitted to the Standing
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration at 2–3 (on file with author) [CARL, “Bill C-31
Brief”]; Refugee Forum, “Fast, Fair and Efficient Refugee Decisions: Are they possible?”
(April 2012), Brief submitted to the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration
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Third, and in my view most importantly, while the implementation of
an appeal on the merits to the RAD is a positive step, the limits on access
to the RAD under the BRRA/PCISA reforms are extremely worrisome.
Depending on which countries are selected as designated countries of
origin, large numbers of refugee claimants may not have access to the
RAD.186 Worse yet, RPD members will be able to insulate their decisions
from review by the RAD simply by declaring claims to be manifestly
unfounded or to have no credible basis. There is evidence that some RPD
members with unusually low refugee claim grant rates are also much
more likely to make these sorts of declarations.187
Taken together, the expected BRRA/PCISA reforms do, in my view,
offer important opportunities to improve the refugee determination
process. However some of the limitations of these reforms (especially the
extremely tight timelines and restrictions on access to an appeal) indicate
that striving for access to a fair and consistent decision-making process
for Federal Court review of IRB refugee determinations remains at least
as pressing as ever.

Conclusion
This study, using a comprehensive dataset of over 23 000 cases from
2005 to 2010, demonstrates that outcomes in applications for judicial
review in the refugee law context all too often hinge on who decides
at 4–8 (on file with author) [Refugee Forum, “Bill C-31 Brief”]; Canadian Civil Liberties
Association, “Bill C-31: An Unjustified Assault on the Rights of People in Danger” (30
April 2012), Brief submitted to the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration
at 7, online: Canadian Civil Liberties Association <http://ccla.org> [CCLA, “Bill C-31
Brief”].
186. CBA, “Bill C-31 Brief”, supra note 185 at 19–21; CARL, “Bill C-31 Brief”, supra note
185 at 4–5; Refugee Forum, “Bill C-31 Brief”, supra note 185 at 8–10; CCLA, “Bill C-31
Brief”, supra note 185 at 7.
187. For example, RPD Member David McBean, who had a 0% refugee claim grant rate
from 2008 to 2010, was much more likely than his colleagues to declare claims to have
no credible basis. See Keung, “Luck”, supra note 17 at A1; Nicholas Keung, “Widowed,
wounded, no refuge; federal judge blasts ruling by refugee board member with zero
acceptance rate”, Toronto Star (9 March 2011) A1, online" The Star <http://www.thestar.
com>. Data on refugee claim grant rates (including “no credible basis rates”) for all RPD
members from 2006 to 2011 is available via links at Rehaag, “Data”, supra note 16.
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the case. The study also shows that the leave requirement, at least as it
has been applied in recent years, creates an arbitrary limit on access to
justice for refugees. These findings confirm earlier empirical research,
with every major study over the past 20 years coming to essentially the
same conclusion: the process is unfair and needs to be reformed. While
there are reasons to be concerned about consistency and fairness at both
the leave stage and the merits stage of judicial review, inconsistency at the
leave stage affects far more applicants, and the decision-making process
at the leave stage lacks even the modest accountability and transparency
found at the merits stage. As a result, this article has set out a number of
possible reforms, including eliminating the leave requirement, reforming
the procedures through which leave is decided, and clarifying the test for
leave.
I would like to end by emphasizing a point made earlier: it goes
without saying that all judicial decision making inevitably involves some
degree of variability across judges. Judges are human beings, and we want
them to be human beings. We want them to be more than machines
applying algorithms. The purpose of this study was not merely to show
that who decides an application matters, and that in borderline cases
an applicant might succeed before one judge but fail before another; its
purpose was to see whether the processes followed and the tests applied
in applications for judicial review of refugee determinations ensure an
acceptable level of consistency and fairness. In my view, the data shows
that the level of variability at the leave stage is too high, and that the
status quo is unsustainable—both in terms of the processes followed and
the tests applied. Reform is urgently needed, especially in light of the
anticipated changes to Canada’s refugee determination system.
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Appendix
Table 1: Overview: Outcomes by Applicant Type (All Cases)
Leave Outcomes
Denied
Granted Granted Withdrawn Pending
Applicant Denied
(Perfected)
(Un(Opposed)
(Not
Type
Perfected)
Opposed)

Total

Minister
Claimant
Total

133
22 914
23 047

2
4 666
4 668

12
14 535
14 547

14
404
418

64
2 846
2 910

34
462
496

7
1
8

Leave
Grant
Rate
(%)
58.65
14.18
14.44

Judicial Review Outcomes (Where Leave Was Granted)
Applicant Denied
Type

Minister
Claimant
Total
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24
1 697
1 721

Granted Granted Withdrawn
(Opposed)
(UnOpposed)

2
305
307

47
1 110
1 157

5
137
142

Pending

0
2
2

Total JR Grant
Rate
(Leave
Granted) (Leave
Granted)
(%)
78
3 251
3 329

62.82
43.53
43.98

JR
Grant
Rate
(All
Cases)
(%)
36.84
6.18
6.35
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Leave Judge Denied Granted Granted Total Leave
Denied Granted Granted Withdrawn Pending
Total JR Grant JR Grant
(Un- (Opposed)
Grant
(Un- (Opposed)
(Leave
Rate
Rate (All
Opposed)
Rate (%)*
Opposed)
Granted) (Leave
Cases)
Granted)
(%)
(%)
Campbell
77.97
27.13
21.43
50
11
177
238
131
9
42
6
0
188
Shore
33.71
26.80
9.33
832
21
423
1 276
301
28
91
24
0
444
Blanchard
27.42
41.44
11.83
278
6
105
389
60
11
35
5
0
111
Simpson
26.15
55.56
15.15
96
2
34
132
14
6
14
2
0
36
O’Keefe
25.91
49.06
13.98
266
13
93
372
51
7
45
3
0
106
Mactavish
25.22
51.85
14.52
347
18
117
482
60
8
62
5
0
135
Russell
24.22
60.22
15.60
266
8
85
359
36
13
43
1
0
93
Barnes
24.05
46.15
12.24
180
8
57
245
29
4
26
6
0
65
Mainville
23.53
37.93
10.28
78
5
24
107
17
3
8
1
0
29
Martineau
23.41
40.63
10.12
579
15
177
771
109
12
66
4
1
192
Hansen
22.66
43.62
11.71
256
19
75
350
46
11
30
7
0
94
Zinn
20.57
39.47
8.47
139
2
36
177
23
2
13
0
0
38
Heneghan
19.65
53.85
11.97
364
15
89
468
44
5
51
4
0
104
de Montigny 683
18.59
37.87
7.51
13
156
852
99
13
51
6
0
169
Mandamin
18.38
62.96
12.32
111
2
25
138
10
5
12
0
0
27
O’Reilly
17.66
47.87
9.36
387
11
83
481
37
10
35
12
0
94
Bédard
16.15
31.82
5.34
109
1
21
131
13
1
6
2
0
22
Dawson
15.48
58.82
12.12
262
20
48
330
23
7
33
5
0
68
Mosley
15.38
48.67
8.08
754
13
137
904
70
10
63
7
0
150
Gauthier
15.17
43.86
7.55
274
8
49
331
31
5
20
1
0
57
Scott
13.33
50.00
11.76
13
2
2
17
1
1
1
1
0
4
Beaudry
12.89
34.34
4.72
622
7
92
721
61
8
26
4
0
99
Pinard
12.85
46.30
6.83
312
8
46
366
29
11
14
0
0
54
Phelan
12.82
43.75
7.37
238
12
35
285
26
7
14
1
0
48
Kelen
12.06
54.31
7.79
693
21
95
809
48
13
50
5
0
116
Rennie
11.94
37.50
4.48
59
0
8
67
4
0
3
1
0
8
11.31
43.81
5.79
Tremblay795
53
13
33
6
0
105
690
17
88
Lamer
Teitlebaum
11.24
39.13
5.20
300
8
38
346
27
4
14
1
0
46
Lemieux
11.00
51.43
6.42
736
14
91
841
48
8
46
3
0
105
Gibson
10.81
66.67
9.71
264
13
32
309
15
9
21
0
0
45

Table 2: Outcomes by Judge Deciding Leave (Perfected Cases Only)†
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†  Excluding cases where the Minister was the applicant and cases where the leave judge was not identified.
*  Excluding cases granted unopposed.

Leave Judge Denied Granted Granted Total Leave
Denied Granted Granted Withdrawn Pending
Total JR Grant JR Grant
(Un- (Opposed)
Grant
(Un- (Opposed)
(Leave
Rate
Rate (All
Opposed)
Rate (%)*
Opposed)
Granted) (Leave
Cases)
Granted)
(%)
(%)
Rouleau
10.53
47.06
5.88
119
3
14
136
8
2
6
1
0
17
Hughes
9.96
53.85
8.20
217
15
24
256
15
12
9
3
0
39
Frenette
9.54
37.04
3.79
237
2
25
264
17
2
8
0
0
27
Layden9.22
71.70
11.91
266
26
27
319
11
9
29
4
0
53
Stevenson
Lutfy
9.04
38.89
3.70
171
1
17
189
11
0
7
0
0
18
Snider
8.91
64.52
6.98
511
12
50
573
21
10
30
0
1
62
LaGacé
7.89
33.33
2.63
70
0
6
76
3
1
1
1
0
6
MacKay
7.69
100.00
7.69
12
0
1
13
0
0
1
0
0
1
7.56
35.00
2.97
648
7
53
708
38
5
16
1
0
60
Noël
Boivin
6.47
7.69
0.58
159
2
11
172
10
0
1
2
0
13
Harrington 729
6.18
52.63
3.82
9
48
786
26
13
17
1
0
57
Finckenstein 201
3.83
50.00
1.91
0
8
209
4
1
3
0
0
8
Blais
3.10
43.75
1.94
344
5
11
360
8
2
5
1
0
16
Near
2.50
55.56
2.45
390
8
10
408
8
4
6
0
0
18
Crampton
1.36
75.00
1.36
217
1
3
221
1
0
3
0
0
4
Hugessen
0.00
n/a
0.00
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Strayer
0.00
n/a
0.00
3
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total
43.53
7.96
14 533
404
2 846
17 783 16.38
1 697
305
1 110
137
2
3 251

Chart 1: Leave Granted Rates (%) for Judges Deciding 50+ Cases
(Perfected Cases Only, Excluding Campbell J)
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Table 3: Judicial Review Outcomes by Judge (Where Leave Granted)†
JR Judge

Denied

Campbell
Hansen
O’Keefe
Mandamin
Dawson
Russell
Mactavish
MacKay
O’Reilly
Lemieux
Scott
Heneghan
Blanchard
Barnes
Layden-Stevenson
Simpson
Strayer
Mainville
Phelan
Gauthier
Kelen
Hughes
Lutfy
Zinn
Rouleau
Harrington
Snider
Finckenstein
Shore
Mosley
Noël
Teitlebaum
Rennie
Martineau
Tremblay-Lamer
Beaudry
Frenette
de Montigny
Bédard
Pinard
Lagacé
Near
Gibson
Crampton

9
10
32
24
23
44
32
1
46
34
12
33
18
47
17
8
4
11
65
30
45
54
22
34
14
57
74
19
92
47
46
27
19
51
51
99
25
69
19
76
53
34
64
35

Tannenbaum
Blais
Boivin
Aalto
Lafrenière
Total

10
26
35
0
0
1 697

Granted
(UnOpposed)
5
7
7
6
4
4
3
0
4
9
0
8
4
6
3
4
0
0
3
4
5
93
3
5
1
10
13
0
20
7
7
5
1
4
7
5
2
9
0
3
2
1
8
2
0
6
3
1
1
305

Granted
(Opposed)
108
27
63
37
30
52
35
1
43
31
10
27
14
36
13
6
3
8
47
19
27
32
13
20
8
32
39
10
47
24
23
13
9
23
21
40
10
27
6
23
13
8
15
8

2
4
3
0
0
1 110

Total (Leave Rate (Leave
Granted) Granted) (%)*
122
44
102
67
57
100
70
2
93
74
22
68
36
89
33
18
7
19
115
53
77
179
38
59
23
99
126
29
159
78
76
45
29
78
79
144
37
105
25
102
68
43
87
45

12
36
41
1
1
3 112

92.31
72.97
66.32
60.66
56.60
54.17
52.24
50.00
48.31
47.69
45.45
45.00
43.75
43.37
43.33
42.86
42.86
42.11
41.96
38.78
37.50
37.21
37.14
37.04
36.36
35.96
34.51
34.48
33.81
33.80
33.33
32.50
32.14
31.08
29.17
28.78
28.57
28.13
24.00
23.23
19.70
19.05
18.99
18.60
16.67
13.33
7.89
n/a
n/a
39.54

†  Excluding cases where the Minister was the applicant and cases where the leave judge
was not identified.
*  Excluding cases granted unopposed.
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Table 4: Outcomes by Demographics of Judges
Leave Outcomes (Perfected Cases Only)†

Leave Judge

Denied
3 175
11 358
11 589

Granted (UnOpposed)
138
266
339

Granted
(Opposed)
598
2 248
2 482

Female
Male
Liberal Party
Appointee
Conservative
Party
Appointee
Total

Total

3 911
13 872
14 410

Leave Grant
Rate (%)*
15.85
16.52
17.64

2 944

65

364

3 373

11.00

14 533

404

2 846

17 783

16.38

JR Outcomes (Where Leave Granted)

†

JR Judge

Denied

Granted (UnOpposed)

Granted
(Opposed)

Total (Leave
Granted)

Female
Male
Liberal Party
Appointee
Conservative
Party
Appointee
Total

297
1 400
1 235

53
252
258

223
887
920

573
2 539
2 413

JR Grant
Rate (Leave
Granted) (%)*
42.88
38.78
42.69

462

47

190

699

29.14

1 697

305

1 110

3 112

39.54

Table 5: Outcomes by City Where Application Filed
City
Montreal
Toronto
Other
Total
City
Montreal
Toronto
Other
Total

Leave Outcomes (Perfected Cases Only)†
Denied
Granted (UnGranted
Total
Opposed)
(Opposed)
5 667
23
811
6 501
7 982
322
1 720
10 024
884
59
315
1 258
14 533
404
2 846
17 783
JR Outcomes (Where Leave Granted)†
Denied
Granted (UnGranted
Total (Leave
Opposed)
(Opposed)
Granted)
560
965
172
1 697

51
194
60
305

190
790
130
1 110

801
1 949
362
3 112

Leave Grant
Rate (%)*
12.52
17.73
26.27
16.38
JR Grant
Rate (Leave
Granted) (%)*
25.33
45.01
43.05
39.54

†  Excluding cases where the Minister was the applicant and cases where the leave judge
(leave outcomes) or JR judge (JR outcomes) was not identified.
*  Excluding cases granted unopposed.
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Table 6: Leave Outcomes by Judge Deciding Leave in Application
Filed in Toronto (Perfected Cases Only)†
JR Judge

Denied

Granted
(Opposed)

Total

Rate (Leave
Granted) (%)*

40
251
14
93
180
32
172
233
235
155
320
83
237
322
113
22
121
351
91
377
186
208
243
12
242
103
108
57
43
196
633
237
78
196
69
11
446
199
296
233

Granted
(UnOpposed)
9
12
1
2
9
3
10
11
7
5
17
2
15
14
5
0
1
7
1
10
6
9
19
2
13
5
8
0
1
9
17
13
3
14
1
0
11
6
7
23

Campbell
Shore
Bedard
Blanchard
Martineau
Mainville
Montigny
O’Keefe
Russell
Barnes
Mactavish
Simpson
Hansen
Heneghan
Gauthier
Lagacé
Zinn
O’Reilly
Mandamin
Mosley
Beaudry
Tremblay-Lamer
Dawson
Scott
Lemieux
Pinard
Teitlebaum
Rennie
Frenette
Phelan
Kelen
Gibson
Rouleau
Hughes
Lutfy
MacKay
Snider
Noël
Harrington
LaydenStevenson
Boivin
Blais
Near
Crampton
Finckenstein
Hugessen
Total

147
176
8
47
87
15
62
80
79
51
101
26
64
77
27
5
27
74
19
69
34
36
41
2
40
17
17
8
6
25
80
26
8
20
7
1
39
17
22
17

196
439
23
142
276
50
244
324
321
211
438
111
316
413
145
27
149
432
111
456
226
253
303
16
295
125
133
65
50
230
730
276
89
230
77
12
496
222
325
273

78.61
41.22
36.36
33.57
32.58
31.91
26.50
25.56
25.16
24.76
23.99
23.85
21.26
19.30
19.29
18.52
18.24
17.41
17.27
15.47
15.45
14.75
14.44
14.29
14.18
14.17
13.60
12.31
12.24
11.31
11.22
9.89
9.30
9.26
9.21
8.33
8.04
7.87
6.92
6.80

72
113
360
120
78
1
7 982

1
4
8
1
0
0
322

2
3
8
2
1
0
1 720

75
120
376
123
79
1
10 024

2.70
2.59
2.17
1.64
1.27
0.00
17.73

†  Excluding cases where the Minister was the applicant and cases where the leave judge
was not identified.
*  Excluding cases granted unopposed.
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Table 7: Outcomes by Year Application Filed
Leave Outcomes (Perfected Cases Only)†

Year

Denied

Granted (UnOpposed)
89
88
58
56
58
55
404

Granted
(Opposed)
619
465
368
346
435
613
2 846

Total

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Total

3 496
2 499
1 571
1 796
2 318
2 853
14 533

Year

Denied

Granted (UnOpposed)

Granted
(Opposed)

Total (Leave
Granted)

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Total

372
251
223
210
257
384
1 697

54
59
39
49
52
52
305

250
221
144
123
168
204
1 110

676
531
406
382
477
640
3 112

4 204
3 052
1 997
2 198
2 811
3 521
17 783

JR Outcomes (Where Leave Granted)†

Leave Grant
Rate (%)*
15.04
15.69
18.98
16.15
15.80
17.69
16.38
JR Grant
Rate (Leave
Granted) (%)*
40.19
46.82
39.24
36.94
39.53
34.69
39.54

Table 8: Outcomes for Applications Filed Before and After Dunsmuir
Leave Outcomes (Perfected Cases Only)†

Application
Filed Before/
After
Dunsmuir
Before
After
Total

Denied

Granted (UnOpposed)

Granted
(Opposed)

Total

Leave Grant
Rate (%)*

7 906
6 627
14 533

245
159
404

1 515
1 331
2 846

9 666
8 117
17 783

16.08
16.73
16.38

Application
Filed Before/
After
Dunsmuir
Before
After
Total

Denied

Granted (UnOpposed)

Granted
(Opposed)

Total (Leave
Granted)

JR Grant
Rate (Leave
Granted) (%)*

877
820
1 697

160
145
305

646
464
1 110

1 683
1 429
3 112

42.42
36.14
39.54

JR Outcomes (Where Leave Granted)†

†  Excluding cases where the Minister was the applicant and cases where the leave judge
(leave outcomes) or JR judge (JR outcomes) was not identified.
*  Excluding cases granted unopposed.
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